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3Executive Summary
This research study analyses the relationship between 
the use of WhatsApp to spread misinformation 
(also known as fake news) and disinformation in 
India, and the increase in lynchings and associated 
vigilante violence in India since 2015. Our focus is on 
the intersection of disinformation, misinformation, 
fake news, propaganda, mob violence, socio-political 
contexts of technology use, technological affordances 
and infrastructures, user experiences and motivations, 
media literacy, policy and regulation. This study will have 
particular resonance outside India for countries such as 
the USA, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil and Indonesia.
Since 2015, there have been more than a hundred 
instances of lynching. Many of these incidents 
victimise individuals from discriminated groups (Dalits, 
Muslims, Christians, Adivasis) based on allegations of 
cow slaughter, cow trafficking and cattle theft. There 
have been further instances of extreme mob violence 
and lynching that have resulted in death, injury and 
trauma to individuals accused of attempted child-
snatching or organ harvesting. Although the victims 
are targeted for different reasons, these incidents have 
in common mobs of vigilantes who use peer-to-peer 
messaging applications such as WhatsApp to spread 
lies about the victims, and use misinformation to 
mobilise, defend, and in some cases to document and 
circulate images of their violence.  
In much public discourse (interpersonal, mediated, 
policy-related and legal), attention has been diverted 
from the crime of lynching onto the alleged crimes of 
cow smuggling or possession of beef that are used 
by mobs to defend their violence. In cases where the 
rumours do not include a bovine related allegation, 
WhatsApp and its parent company are viewed as 
playing a central role not just in operationalising but 
also in causing lynch-mob violence. A subset of these 
lynchings in India have come to be known as the 
“WhatsApp lynchings”. 
The systematic literature that we documented and 
analysed for this report highlights that the political 
atmosphere in India has become increasingly 
authoritarian, anti-democratic and volatile. Politicians 
regularly accuse Muslim communities on a range of 
pretexts, and provide political rewards to those who 
perpetrate violence against them. 
In framing our methods we took the view that digital 
communication practices take place within particular 
socio-political contexts and in turn shape socio-political 
contexts. Our study of WhatsApp use, the spread of 
misinformation and vigilante violence is therefore 
situated in the relationship between the technological 
and the social. 
The methods of this study include extended qualitative 
interviews with expert stakeholders and focus groups 
with multiple sets of users across four large states: 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh during 2019. In addition, we used textual 
analysis of WhatsApp forwards – text, still and moving 
images. During focus groups and interviews with 
working and middle class users, men, women and 
young people, urban and rural as well as literate and 
illiterate users with a spectrum of political opinions, 
and during expert interviews, we examined the daily 
practices of WhatsApp usage in the contemporary 
Indian socio-political context. 
Our analysis found patterns in the data suggesting 
that WhatsApp messages work in tandem with ideas, 
tropes, messages and stereotypes which circulate 
more widely in the public domain, in family and 
community conversations and in the mainstream news 
media. A variant of a particular stereotype, narrative 
or trope containing misinformation or disinformation, 
or that is entirely propaganda, will often appear at the 
same time on social media and in mainstream news 
media and even in film (transmediality). Therefore, even 
when users call on some incipient media literacy to “go 
to more than one source when in doubt”, they may find 
verification of the false information in the mainstream 
media. Conversely, the fact that mainstream media 
has been responsible for broadcasting the hate-speech 
and stereotypes in the speeches of politicians without 
much criticism or questioning means that messages 
on WhatsApp which disparage particular communities 
or call for action against them (for example: Dalits, 
Muslims, Adivasis, Kashmiris, Christians) are less 
likely to be perceived as misinformation. Likewise, the 
sensationalism of mainstream media formats and 
genres works very well when edited and used out of 
context (intertextuality) in WhatsApp-based propaganda 
or misinformation.
4WhatsApp use and WhatsApp content is highly 
gendered. This is the case in terms of access to 
smartphones, privacy of use, media literacy and spending 
power (for device and data). This finding needs to be 
considered in the context of the allied finding that the 
ready availability of digital technologies has contributed 
to new forms of physical and virtual violence. Outside 
the public domain, such physical, psychological and 
mediated violence is disproportionately directed against 
women, more so if they belong to Muslim, Dalit, Adivasi, 
Christian or any other minority groups. Forms of 
WhatsApp- and smart-phone enabled violence against 
women in India include unsolicited sexts, sex tapes, rape 
videos, surveillance, violation of privacy, bullying, forced 
confrontation with pornographic material, blackmail and 
humiliation. All of these actions were reported to us both 
in urban and rural areas. 
A key finding is that in the case of violence against a 
specific group (Muslims, Christians, Dalits, Adivasis, etc.)  
there exists widespread, simmering distrust, hatred, 
contempt and suspicion towards Pakistanis, Muslims, 
Dalits and critical or dissenting citizens amongst a 
section of rural and urban upper and middle caste Hindu 
men and women. WhatsApp users in these demographics 
are predisposed both to believe disinformation and to 
share misinformation about discriminated groups in 
face-to-face and WhatsApp networks. Regardless of the 
inaccuracy of sources or of the WhatsApp posts, this type 
of user appears to derive confidence in (mis)information 
and/or hate-speech from the correspondence of message 
content with their own set of prejudiced ideological 
positions and discriminatory beliefs. 
Another key finding is that there is a strong affective 
element at play in the use of WhatsApp for the 
circulation of content that is apparently informational. 
Amidst the flow of hundreds of messages, the ones 
which stand out are those that convey a sense of 
immediacy, and those that can and do have shock value. 
During elections, or during incidents of cross-border 
military action, simmering sentiments become high-
intensity situations where the quality of disinformation 
and propaganda becomes immediately inflammatory. 
In these circumstances, the chance of long-term 
discrimination turning into physical violence against 
particular demographic groups increases. 
We found a diverse range of user motivations that spur 
the sharing of and belief in misinformation based on 
rumours about child kidnapping and organ harvesting. 
These include: the naiveté of older users who choose 
to believe messages forwarded by known and trusted 
individuals in their communities; the belief that it is a civic 
duty to use violence or threat against suspicious outsiders 
and to pass on information about (even unverified) 
suspicious activities; the need to be seen as a local “expert” 
or an authentic “first source” for local information.  
In both cases of violence motivated by prejudice 
(against a particular group or community) and 
cases motivated by rumour, many WhatsApp users 
we spoke to also acknowledged the affective and 
temporal labour required to contribute to, circulate and 
consume misinformation. In some cases, the emotional 
disturbance felt by users on viewing a clip of spectacular 
violence or overwhelming content (train or road 
accidents, harm caused by natural disasters) impelled the 
recipients of these WhatsApp messages to share them 
with others and/or discuss them within their networks. In 
other cases, this kind of content contributed to a sense 
of emotional fatigue and exhaustion whereby WhatsApp 
users would forward disinformation without checking the 
message fully or would bulk delete messages from their 
most prolific groups. 
We found that for most WhatsApp users in India civic 
trust follows ideological, family and communal ties 
far more closely than is reported in other literature on 
this topic. We were told strongly and repeatedly that 
the immediate source of a forward – the person who 
forwarded the message to the group or the individual – 
is one of the most important factors in a user’s decision 
to forward a piece of information, misinformation, 
disinformation or fake news. If this person is regarded 
as a trusted source, then even the most implausible, or 
fake-looking messages, are accepted as accurate, and 
passed on. We were further told that even if a user has 
some qualms about a particular piece of misinformation 
or disinformation and has reason to suspect that it 
contains some inaccurate information, respect for the 
status or personality of the person who sent it to them 
often prevents them from reporting it. 
5This report proposes that the notions of a “WhatsApp 
user”, “fake news”, “misinformation” and “disinformation” 
should be disaggregated, defined, and then linked to 
flexible, country/context-specific socio-political typologies. 
Based on our fieldwork, this report includes flexible socio-
political and demography-based “typologies” of users 
and of misinformation/ disinformation in India. We argue 
that while these typologies would have some overlaps 
with users and messages in other regions there are also 
specificities that have to be understood in the Indian 
sociohistorical context. 
Our typologies of misinformation/disinformation and 
of WhatsApp users counter some deeply held beliefs 
in the extant literature and amongst the public about 
who is responsible for the circulation of life-threatening, 
violence-related misinformation and disinformation. 
In a majority of instances, misinformation and 
disinformation which contributes to the formation of 
mobs that engage in lynching and other discriminatory 
violence appears to be spread largely for reasons of 
prejudice and ideology rather than out of ignorance or 
digital illiteracy. 
Our analysis of data on which the typology is based 
highlights that in India, on the one hand, if a WhatsApp 
user is male, urban or rural, young or middle aged, 
technologically literate, Hindu, upper or middle caste, 
then they are more likely to share particular types 
of misinformation, disinformation and hate-speech. 
Some user narratives in our fieldwork go as far as to 
suggest that this type of technologically-literate, male, 
Hindu user is also more likely to create and administer 
the groups responsible for ideologically charged 
misinformation, disinformation and hate-speech on 
WhatsApp in the first place. On the other hand, if a 
WhatsApp user is lower caste, Dalit, or Muslim and/
or a woman and/or rural, particularly with lower 
levels of technological literacy, then such a user is 
less likely to create and curate and unlikely even to 
forward ideologically-charged misinformation and 
disinformation. Women in both groups with ties to 
men who hold prejudices against minority communities 
admit to forwarding messages for ideological reasons 
and to reporting the receipt of messages that question 
or criticise ideological misinformation. This finding does 
not hold good for health-related misinformation, which 
we did not examine systematically during our study and 
which deserves an entire study of its own. 
In the arena of malicious rumour-based violence about 
child snatchers and organ harvesting, user motivations 
for forwarding misinformation and fake news stories 
are not based on ideology but rather on a generalised 
mistrust of strangers, and on affinity to the message 
sender and extreme trust in the group through which 
the user received the message. Based on fieldwork, 
participants in the spread of such rumours seem 
overwhelmingly to be male; albeit a minority, women, 
too, participate in online, face-to-face and telephonic 
sharing of concerns around such issues, and are also 
sometimes culpable in shielding the perpetrators of 
violence during the planning and execution of lynchings.
We recommend that the deadly consequences 
of misinformation and disinformation are always 
approached in a broader socio-political context where 
all stakeholders involved including the corporations 
which own platforms and cross-platform apps, local and 
national governments, wings of the state, civil society 
organisations and local WhatsApp users share greater 
responsibility and are held accountable in a systematic 
way until justice has been served and the misuse is 
demonstrably curbed. 
Based on expert interviews and focus groups with 
users, a common view, even amongst those who share 
misinformation, seems to be that 1) if the mechanisms 
for reporting misinformation and disinformation were 
more transparent and effective then it would decline. 
To that, we add that the sharing of misinformation and 
disinformation which legitimises or leads to violence 
would decline if:
2)  the sharing of misinformation and disinformation in-
app or on a platform was easier to track and report
3)  the app-related penalties for sharing misinformation 
and disinformation were clearer (one strike and you’re 
suspended; three strikes and you’re banned)
4)  investment for widening efforts to include critical 
media literacy with an emphasis on constitutional 
values and human rights were increased and
5)  mirroring efforts on child pornography, there 
were concerted international, national and cross-
stakeholder efforts to recognise, categorise and 
take action against anti-minority hate-speech and/or 
Islamophobic and anti-Dalit content.
6With regard to technical fixes to the application, we 
recommend that:
1)  Sharing messages on groups be restricted to one group 
at a time, if not as default, then at the very least during 
sensitive occasions (such as elections)
2)  It should not be possible to add users to groups without 
their permission as a default, considering the social, 
political and historical context
3)  There should be special protections for vulnerable 
groups: the reporting and take-down of disinformation 
and misinformation especially related to misogyny, 
rape or planned rape, other violence against women, 
hate crime and abuse of Muslims, Christians, Dalits and 
Adivasis should be made far easier than it currently is
4)  Any reports of disinformation or misinformation relating 
to child kidnapping/kidney snatching also need to be 
prioritised and fast-tracked in order to prevent lynching
5)  In order to address violence arising out of 
disinformation pre-emptively, we recommend that 
WhatsApp consider introducing a “beacon” feature 
where users can be warned about disinformation that 
risks leading to violence.
WhatsApp, in collaboration with Indian law enforcement 
agencies, needs to persuade the Android operating system 
to ban all unauthorised versions of WhatsApp.
We further suggest that all future actions by WhatsApp 
take into account that current efforts channelled towards 
new legislations, functional media literacy, and changes 
in the product design of WhatsApp are important but 
insufficient for preventing misinformation related violence 
of both ideological and non-ideological types.
In order to curb violence related to disinformation and 
misinformation, corporations as well as civil society 
institutions (including academics and activists) need 
to invest serious resources into working with local civil 
society organisations, journalists, police forces, schools 
and universities to develop critical media literacies 
allied to human rights literacy. These include but must 
not be limited to:
1)  Understandings of the ways in which the media treat 
and should treat considerations of caste, gender, 
class and religion and the effects of particular forms 
of reporting, misinformation and disinformation on 
specific groups
2)  Understandings of the balance between the need 
for freedom of speech, curation of information, user 
privacy and the right to life
3)  Understandings of the influence of, and compromises 
reached between, corporate profit motives and 
political motives.
Overall, our report concludes that while it is imperative 
for the major global corporation which runs WhatsApp 
to take its responsibility for the ongoing deaths in India 
seriously and to play a central and transparent role in 
altering the technological and social aspects of the app 
in order to curb the potentials for such extreme violence, 
ideologically motivated mobs will in all likelihood 
circumvent these measures, and much violence will 
continue until the underlying political and social causes 
and encouragements of hate-speech, discrimination, 
vigilantism and destabilisation of democracy in India are 
addressed far more widely.
Dr Shakuntala Banaji
Associate Professor
Ram Bhat
PhD Researcher
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and Shreyas Sardesai, “Does Media Exposure Affect Voting Behaviour and Political Preferences in India?,” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 39 
(2015): 82–88.
5 Diego Alejo Vasquez Pimentel, Inigo Macias Aymar, and Max Lawson, Reward Work Not Wealth (Oxford, 2019).
6 Ibid.; Michael Forster, Wen-Hao Chen, and Ana Llenanozal, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (Brussels, 2011), oecd.org/els/
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Recent reports1 examining mob violence and lynching 
in India find that filesharing sites and peer-to-peer 
messaging services, and in several cases the cross-
platform app WhatsApp, have played a crucial role in 
the lynchings and other extreme violence resulting 
from the spread of misinformation in India. They argue 
that WhatsApp and messaging services must take 
some responsibility for preventing future crimes of 
this type. Our report discusses evidence from analysis 
of the messages forwarded by users and the users’ 
own justifications of and motivations for passing on 
information that turns out to be false; in this context, 
while we find that although the role and influence of 
media and communications technologies has been 
overestimated and the role and influence of mainstream 
broadcast and electronic media narratives, government 
briefings, ministerial speeches, and local social contexts 
have been under-estimated, WhatsApp and parent 
company Facebook can still contribute significantly to 
preventing the involvement of their products in on-going 
lynchings and the formation of murderous mobs. 
As of 2019, close to 900 television channels go on air in 
India, with more than 400 of these devoted specifically 
to news2. A tiny number of corporations such as 
Reliance (owned by Mukesh Ambani), Sun (owned by 
Maran brothers) and Zee (owned by Subhash Chandra) 
dominate the market. Since they are broadcast from a 
satellite, television channels have a default nation-wide 
footprint, although their commercial value stems from 
their potential in a specific language market such as 
Hindi, Telugu, Gujarati and so on3. 
The most important television language market is 
Hindi-speakers, and the maximum number of television 
channels cater to Hindi speaking audiences who live 
across North Indian states – the so-called “Hindi 
heartland”. Regardless of the growing number of news 
channels, the media sector, in pursuing increasing 
profits, has failed to allocate sufficient resources for 
on-the-ground reporting. Most news channels therefore 
confine themselves to a well-worn format, the studio 
debate, in which a number of “talking heads” argue, 
sometimes very acrimoniously, against each other and/
or the anchor person who fans the flames, and acts as 
agent provocateur. With ownership increasingly being 
concentrated into a few powerful corporate hands, 
there is evidence that many Indian news channels 
have chosen to support the BJP government and 
ruling party’s ideology and actions overtly through their 
television channels, their anchor people and the guests 
they invite on these debates4.
Despite the widespread proliferation of media and 
communication technologies, more specifically of 
smartphones, since 2003-4, wealth inequality continues 
to rise in India. Further, basic infrastructural items 
such as paved roads, pipes for running water and an 
electricity grid with capacity are frequently unavailable 
or in poor shape for the majority of citizens; while basic 
services required for a dignified life and for wellbeing 
such as health provision, education, housing and the 
availability of employment that pays a living wage are 
often absent altogether5. Additionally, as sociological 
research confirms,6 a multitude of prejudices and 
8violent, discriminatory practices have continued to 
impede wellbeing for many. There is also evidence that 
the problematic deployment by the government of India 
of a technologised identification system (Aadhaar/
UIDAI) for managing individuals and regulating their 
interactions with the state have further disenfranchised 
some of India’s most vulnerable citizens7. 
Even while many citizens’ day-to-day lives are shaped by 
these realities, mobile phones and messaging platforms 
such as WhatsApp are being used on an unprecedented 
scale8. This includes their use by groups who engage 
in systematic discrimination9 and who aim to inflict 
violence upon communities that have been historically 
oppressed10. In this context, as a recent BBC report on 
fake news in India confirms, the introduction and usage 
of free, cross-platform messenger services such as 
7 Shiv Sahay Singh, “Death by Digital Exclusion? : On Faulty Public Distribution System in Jharkhand,” The Hindu, July 13, 2019, accessed August 12, 
2019, thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/death-by-digital-exclusion/article28414768.ece
8 Nilesh Christopher, “TikTok Is Fuelling India’s Deadly Hate Speech Epidemic,” Wired, last modified 2019, accessed August 12, 2019, wired.co.uk/
article/tiktok-india-hate-speech-caste; Kunal Purohit, “The Islamophobic Roots of Population Control Efforts in India,” Al-Jazeera, last modified 
2019, accessed August 12, 2019, aljazeera.com/indepth/features/islamophobic-roots-population-control-efforts-india-190808085219969.html
9 Omar Khalidi, “Hinduising India: Secularism in Practice,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1545–1562; Edward Anderson and Christophe 
Jaffrelot, “Contemporary South Asia Hindu Nationalism and the ‘Saffronisation of the Public Sphere’: An Interview with Christophe Jaffrelot,” 
Contemporary South Asia 26, no. 4 (2018): 468–482; Shakuntala Banaji, “Vigilante Publics: Orientalism, Modernity and Hindutva Fascism in India,” 
Javnost - The Public 25, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 333–350.
10 Anand Teltumbde, The Persistence of Caste: The Khairlanji Murders and India’s Hidden Apartheid (London: Zed Books, 2010); Y. Chinna Rao, “Dalit 
Movement in Andhra Pradesh: A Historical Outline of a Hundred Years,” Indian Historical Review 42, no. 1 (June 16, 2015): 113–139.
11 Santanu Chakrabarti, Lucy Stengel, and Sapna Solanki, Duty, Identity, Credibility: Fake News and the Ordinary Citizen in India (London, 2018), 
accessed July 10, 2019, downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/duty-identity-credibility.pdf
WhatsApp, platforms such as Facebook and ShareChat, 
and short-form video-sharing apps such as TikTok can 
be said to have wrought changes in the practices of 
sharing disinformation11, mob violence and, in some 
cases, to have facilitated the perpetrators. 
Associated with the speed and reach of the spread of 
such rumours, mobs of individuals with little previous 
trust in each other and no history of extreme violence, 
can be brought together either autonomously or 
alongside pre-existing politically aligned vigilante cadres, 
to harass, beat, torture, maim or kill individuals who 
are falsely accused of crimes via the aforementioned 
rumours. This report analyses data collected regarding 
the social and psychological formation of these 
“WhatsApp vigilante” groupings. 
9Mob Violence
12 Manjula Pradeep and Gautam Thaker, Una Fact Finding Report (Ahmedabad, 2016), sabrangindia.in/ann/pucl-fact-finding-report-asks-judicial-
enquiry-una-incident; Human Rights Watch, India Report 2018, 2019, hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/india; Delhi Solidarity Group, 
Recent Militant Violence against Adivasis in Assam (Delhi, 2015), scribd.com/document/254592636/Recent-Violence-Against-Adivasis-in-Assam-
Report-of-a-Fact-Finding-Team-January-2015; Achiume, Tendayi, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, UN General Assembly (2018), undocs.org/en/A/73/305
13 Wendy Doniger, “Hinduism and Its Complicated History with Cows (and People Who Eat Them),” The Conversation, last modified 2017, accessed 
August 3, 2019, theconversation.com/hinduism-and-its-complicated-history-with-cows-and-people-who-eat-them-80586
14 Ish Mishra et al., “Fact Finding Report: Independent Inquiry into Muzaffarnagar ‘Riots,’” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 2 (January 11, 2014), 
accessed August 7, 2019, epw.in/journal/2014/2/reports-states-web-exclusives/fact-finding-report-independent-inquiry-muzaffarnagar
15 Geeta Pandey, “Jai Shri Ram: The Hindu Chant that became a murder cry”, accessed August 1, 2019, bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-48882053
16 Lynch Factchecker previously at lynch.factchecker.in; recently taken down without any reason given. For more details, see: newslaundry.com/ 
2019/09/12/factchecker-shuts-down-hate-crime-watch-samar-halarnkars-stint-with-india-spend-ends
17 Pranav Dixit and Ryan Mac, “How WhatsApp Destroyed A Village,” Buzzfeed News, last modified 2018, accessed July 7, 2019, buzzfeednews.com/
article/pranavdixit/whatsapp-destroyed-village-lynchings-rainpada-india
Organised pogroms, large scale intergroup violence 
and mob violence against oppressed and discriminated 
groups has existed in India and across South Asia since 
before independence. Since 1947, India has witnessed 
several distinct types of mob violence. The kind of mob 
violence which has typically been termed “religious 
rioting” is perceived as taking place primarily between 
Hindu and Muslim communities, although in the last 
four decades it has consisted mostly of Hindu mobs 
inflicting damage upon Muslim bodies and property, and 
in the notable case of 1984, on Sikhs, compared to the 
other way around; and in some places upon Christians 
(especially on Christians in Adivasi regions in Central 
India and North Eastern states). These have been largely 
concentrated in urban areas although some violence has 
also spilled into peri-urban and rural areas. 
Some mob violence is closely related to caste 
hierarchies, wherein dominant castes have inflicted 
extreme violence and atrocities upon Dalits and other 
oppressed groups outside the caste hierarchy.  
Other mob violence is against a specific target  
(people of a specific region such as Kashmiris, or 
ethnicity linked to region – those from north eastern 
states, Rohingya refugees). 
Many of these “incidents” have been demonstrated 
through fact-finding missions12 to be systematically 
organised pogroms, which ultimately displace hundreds 
of thousands from the targeted minority communities, 
destroy homes and businesses, and leave the families of 
the dead or missing traumatised and fighting for justice.
It can be seen therefore, that what gets called “mob 
violence” is not a homogenous phenomenon. Rather 
than being random and unfathomable, it has a long 
and politically motivated history as well as a socially 
disciplinary function in India. Given this diversity of 
contexts, forms and practices of mob violence, it is 
necessary to suggest the contours and characteristics of 
mob violence that this report refers to. 
When we write of mob violence in this report, we refer 
first to a notable increase in mob lynchings both on and 
off-camera, many of which are perpetrated by groups of 
Hindus against families, couples or lone Muslims, Adivasis 
and Dalits, as well as against the occasional caste Hindu 
who could not “prove” their credentials in time to save their 
own life or prevent a beating. Most of these beatings and 
murders are based on a fairly specific set of allegations – 
that the victims were in possession of beef13 (cow meat) or 
that the victims were smuggling cattle, or that the victims 
were “stealing” and attempting to “convert” higher caste/ 
Hindu girls14 (this accusation is mostly levelled at Muslim 
men). More recently, Muslims have been targeted, even 
beaten to death, for not responding swiftly enough to the 
demand that they chant “Jai Shri Ram” (victory to lord Ram) 
or “Pakistan Murdabad” (down with Pakistan), Bharat Mata 
Ki Jai (victory to mother India)15
Since 2012, extreme violence relating to the rhetorical 
“protection of cows” has been on the rise. Documented 
deaths include 302 victims through 127 incidents of such 
violence. 86 per cent of the victims have been men, and 
the incidents took place largely (76 per cent) when the BJP 
has been in power at state government level16. The second 
kind of mob violence is to do with unspecified rumours 
that do not have the aforementioned political history but 
refer to “strangers” who are apparently involved in child-
kidnapping and/or illegal organ harvesting. In the latter type 
of mob violence, there has not been a discernible pattern 
with regard to the caste or religion of the perpetrators and 
victims. The rumours and subsequent allegations of child 
abduction have resulted in over 40 deaths with a far greater 
number injured and traumatised17. 
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A further type of mob violence since 2014 pertains to 
the gathering of mobs both on university campuses 
and more generally in cities and towns to intimidate, 
beat up and physically punish fellow citizens who make 
their dissenting or critical views known with regard to 
extreme nationalism, the policies of the Hindu Right 
and/or caste discrimination. In the last five years, in 
spite of the Supreme Court striking down Section 66A 
of the IT Act 2000, there are multiple examples of 
both harassment by state functionaries18 as well as 
organised and politically-motivated mobs gathering to 
intimidate citizens who post critical political questions 
in their Facebook statuses, who tweet their scepticism 
of the government narrative on issues such as the 
18 Gopal Sathe, “The Supreme Court Struck Down Section 66A of the IT Act in 2015, Why Are Cops Still Using It to Make Arrests?,” Huffington Post, last 
modified 2018, accessed August 3, 2019, huffingtonpost.in/2018/10/15/the-supreme-court-struck-down-section-66a-of-the-it-act-in-2015-why-
are-cops-still-using-it-to-make-arrests_a_23561703/
19 Mridula Chari et al., “After Pulwama, a Facebook Group Targeted ‘anti-National’ Indians,” Quartz India, last modified 2019, accessed August 3, 2019, 
qz.com/india/1553592/after-pulwama-a-facebook-group-targeted-anti-national-indians/
Pulwama attack and its aftermath, or who show 
solidarity for ordinary Kashmiris19. While frequently not 
fatal, this mob violence is ubiquitous and plays a role in 
deterring dissent or criticism of any kind. 
Importantly, in almost every documented case, 
WhatsApp and/or a similar peer-to-peer messaging 
service has played at least three roles – 1) the 
circulation of information about the victims, 2) the fast-
paced mobilisation of a group who come to constitute 
the lynch mob, and 3) the post-violence circulation either 
by the perpetrators or by bystanders of still and moving 
images of the violence, which often then lead to further 
widespread fear, communal tension and violence. 
Figure 1: WhatsApp related mob lynching 
incidents (Image from Wikimedia Commons, 
July 2018).
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Mis and Dis information
20 India has multiple laws that relate to the issue of hate speech. For a more detailed analysis of hate speech as it relates to constitutional law, Indian 
Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws, see Chinmayi Arun, Arpita Biswas, and Parul Sharma, Hate Speech Laws in India (Delhi, 
2018), drive.google.com/file/d/1pDoIwlusnM3ys-1GAYbnTPmepU22b2Zr/view
21 Indo-Asian News Service, “Facebook Vice President Joel Kaplan To Appear Before Parliamentary Panel On March 6,” NDTV, last modified 2019, 
accessed May 6, 2019, ndtv.com/india-news/facebook-vice-president-joel-kaplan-to-appear-before-parliamentary-panel-on-march-6-2002092
22 BC Stahl, “On the Difference or Equality of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation: A Critical Research Perspective.,” Informing Science 9 
(2006): 83–96; Natascha A. Karlova and Jin Ha Lee, “Notes from the Underground City of Disinformation: A Conceptual Investigation,” Proceedings of 
the American Society for Information Science and Technology 48, no. 1 (January 11, 2011): 1–9; James H. Fetzer, “Disinformation: The Use of False 
Information,” Minds and Machines 14, no. 2 (May 2004): 231–240; Don Fallis, “What Is Disinformation?,” Library Trends 63, no. 3 (2015): 401–426.
23 Teltumbde, The Persistence of Caste: The Khairlanji Murders and India’s Hidden Apartheid; Banaji, “Vigilante Publics: Orientalism, Modernity and 
Hindutva Fascism in India.”
Media and communications are both produced within 
and subsequently act upon social relations. We take 
the view that the problems of misinformation and 
disinformation should be analysed from a perspective 
that sees social norms and contexts and technological 
affordances and uses as mutually constitutive and 
interlinked. Deliberate factual distortions, misinformation 
and disinformation – all of which get called “fake news” 
as an umbrella term – are not phenomena that can be 
fixed through simple media regulatory mechanisms or 
technological innovations alone, without concomitant 
interventions in the spheres of law, social policy, politics 
and social relations. It is only by addressing entrenched 
problems of ignorance, religious, regional and caste 
bias, prejudice, hate speech, casteism, racism, misogyny 
and ethnoreligious political propaganda amongst those 
with high skills and access to technology that solutions 
to mob violence such as the so-called “WhatsApp 
lynchings” can be conceived. By hate speech, we refer 
to Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), namely “any advocacy 
of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law20”
At the outset, it helps to clarify terminology. It is 
disingenuous and unproductive to conflate or use the 
terms fake news, misinformation and disinformation 
interchangeably as if they do not have political histories 
and implications. For instance, while misinformation 
can be information that is simply inaccurate, 
disinformation is usually linked to powerful, covert 
political actors operating either autonomously, or 
as part of the state and through proxies, to produce 
and share systematically distorted information in 
order to gain results that will favour their political 
goals. The term “fake news”, which since 2016 has 
become a generic coverall term for the manipulation of 
information and circulation of deliberately misleading 
or false information in a wide range of contexts from 
health and wellbeing to politics, is often used without 
analysing the historical connections with longstanding 
political agendas, propaganda and hate-speech, and to 
systematic discrimination. Further, it is a term which 
has come to be used by certain politicians to undermine 
the credibility of any information that is not favourable 
to their own political party’s point of view or their 
governments’ actions21. 
All forms of social relations (including those involved 
with communication) are necessarily caught up in 
the flows and pressures of power. Misinformation 
refers to a broad set of communicative practices that 
seek to deceive, and includes unintentional deception. 
Disinformation is a subset that refers to deliberation and 
intentionality in communication22.
In this light, we view disinformation as a set of 
communicative practices that intentionally and 
deliberately seek to a) discredit particular groups 
who seek justice, equity and political power through 
democratic means and come to threaten the interests 
of powerful political and/or economic actors, and/ 
or b) to normalise and legitimise discrimination and/
or c) to fuel brief or extended incidents of spectacular 
demonstrable violence against certain social groups 
and/or individuals which in turn cements the identity 
of ruling groups and warns the victim communities not 
to seek justice and redress23. So, to what extent do all 
these technological, corporate, governmental, civic and 
social factors intersect in the spread of misinformation 
and disinformation?
Reliance Jio and the Smartphone Market
24 Enabling 5G in India (Delhi, 2019), Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, accessed July 26, 2019, main.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/White_
Paper_22022019.pdf
25 Daniel Block, “How Reliance Jio Is Monopolising the Telecom Sector,” The Caravan (Delhi, February 2019), accessed July 21, 2019, 
caravanmagazine.in/reportage/government-helping-reliance-jio-monopolise-telecom
26 IANS, “Average Selling Price of Smartphones in India down 16% in 10 Years: ICEA-KPMG Report,” The News Minute, last modified 2019, accessed 
July 21, 2019, thenewsminute.com/article/average-selling-price-smartphones-india-down-16-10-years-icea-kpmg-report-99025
27 Mihir Sharma, “India’s Burgeoning Youth Are the World’s Future,” Live Mint, last modified 2017, accessed July 21, 2019, livemint.com/
Opinion/2WSy5ZGR9ZO3KLDMGiJq2J/Indias-burgeoning-youth-are-the-worlds-future.html
Mobile phone usage has been on the rise in India since 
2003, and smartphones have taken a significant share 
of the market since 201324. Due to the structure of the 
telecom market, spectrum licensing (especially 3G 
and 4G spectrum) has been auctioned at extremely 
high costs and the public sector BSNL has not been 
allotted any 4G spectrum. As a result, a few large private 
sector service providers have been providing spectrum 
conducive to data – 3G and 4G spectrum. Given the high 
levels of investment, these companies – Idea, Airtel, 
Vodafone and a few other companies have hitherto 
dominated the market but also have concentrated 
their data operations in urban areas. The expectation is 
that the urban consumer will spend more on data and 
therefore telecom companies will have a faster rate of 
return (on spectrum investments) from urban areas. 
Rural areas are still largely serviced by 2G infrastructure.
In 2016, Reliance-owned Jio mobiles entered the market. 
The entry of Jio phones into the market was eased by 
multiple competition-busting government-sponsored 
promotions, what might be considered unfair trading 
practice by other competitor companies and by the 
state-owned internet infrastructure. For almost one year 
beginning in late 2016, Jio was allowed to hand out free 
voice calls and unlimited data to all subscribers. Such 
predatory pricing, carried out by Jio with full cognisance 
of and complicity by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India (TRAI), has led to two major outcomes – it forced 
a restructuring of the telecom market including the loss 
of hundreds of jobs, and secondly a driving down of data 
tariffs. The downward revision of tariffs has benefited 
some customers in the short run but in the long run has 
dangerous implications for the telecom market in India. 
The industry is heading towards oligopoly and companies 
are locked into debt that they are struggling to repay. It 
has happened simply because a large company with 
resources like Reliance has been able to bear losses for a 
year, influencing the whole market25. It is quite similar to 
strategies deployed by companies like Uber and Amazon 
that drive down tariffs in order to influence and dominate 
the market.
As a result of Jio’s entry, data has become cheaper 
and infrastructure for wireless telecommunication has 
expanded into rural areas at an unprecedented pace. 
In parallel, the cost of smartphones has also come 
down 16 per cent in a span of ten years26. One of the 
reasons for this lowering of cost is that China has 
intensified the range, diversity and density of smartphone 
manufacturing and exports to India at low prices, and a 
few Indian manufacturers such as Micromax, have also 
been able to bring out relatively low-cost smartphones. 
Given the proliferation of smartphones and of relatively 
more affordable data packages, smartphone users 
in India represent a high-volume market for apps. 
Communicative platforms (and associated apps) such 
as YouTube, Facebook, Facebook Messenger, TikTok, 
WhatsApp, Instagram, Telegram, ShareChat, ShareIt, 
Zapya and many others all consider India to be one 
of their biggest, most important and fastest growing 
markets. More than 600 million Indians are under the 
age of 2527. If this population can be persuaded to adopt 
these applications from an early age, the companies who 
own platforms and applications (a majority of which are 
based in the U.S. or China) hope that the Indian market 
will yield high revenues consistently in future decades. 
WhatsApp and its emergence need to be situated in this 
broad context. As a basic cross-platform chat application 
with minimum frills and complications, it has been 
adopted quickly and enthusiastically by smartphone 
users in India. The focus is on sending instantaneous 
messages to any contact on the smartphone who has 
installed the app. For a country with relatively low levels 
of textual literacy, WhatsApp’s ability to enable the 
exchange of audio-visual content has been liberating. So 
far, it has been expensive to transmit and receive audio-
content because of the data usage charges but after 
Jio, all service providers have been forced to make data 
usage charges much cheaper. 
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28 Kiran Sharma, “India Lynchings Prompt WhatsApp Action on False Rumors,” Nikkei Asian Review, last modified July 2018, accessed July 26, 2019, 
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/India-lynchings-prompt-WhatsApp-action-on-false-rumors
29 Each of these interviews and discussions was conducted only after obtaining rigorous informed consent and following procedures to ensure 
protection and security of the dataset as well as to protect the identity of our interview and focus group participants. All interviews and discussions 
were translated to English and transcribed, coded and analysed using key words, themes and concepts that emerged from our research questions.
We chose to conduct multi-sited, in-depth qualitative 
research in four states – Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Maharashtra. Situated in geographically 
diverse parts of the country – Centre, North, South and 
West, all four states have witnessed religious, caste-
based, political and “stranger-danger” mob violence 
since 2014. The field sites were selected partly due to 
our existing connections and contacts as well as our 
knowledge of regional languages spoken in these states. 
In each state, we contacted trusted gatekeepers – 
individuals or organisations with a track-record of doing 
grassroots democratic work with local communities 
and/or contacts in particular local communities with 
longstanding WhatsApp accounts. They assisted us in 
contacting a wide range of WhatsApp and smartphone 
users, and oriented us towards citizens in contexts and 
places where large numbers of people did not and/or 
could not use smartphones. 
Our research focuses on users aged 18 to 
approximately 45, although a few users above this 
age are also included. In terms of caste, class, religion 
and gender, we incorporated a diverse sample of 
interviewees and field sites, paying attention to social 
and cultural mixtures. Our rationale for selecting 
these diverse locations was both theoretical and 
methodological. We remain keenly aware that “mob 
violence” based on mediated misinformation is 
sometimes disparagingly associated with users in rural 
areas, with those who are illiterate and poor28. What 
we characterise as a sense of moral panic and elite 
contempt come together to generate anxiety about how 
those at the bottom of the social and economic ladder 
need technology to raise themselves out of poverty, 
but are also unfit – because of a lack of skills and 
knowledge – to use modern technologies in productive 
ways. We note that rumours circulate on social media 
and that mob violence occurs in both rural and urban 
areas; this violence is perpetrated by both dominant 
and oppressed caste members (although dominant 
castes are usually perpetrators, and victims are mostly 
from oppressed castes) and by both highly literate 
and illiterate citizens. Most incidents of mob violence 
are by men and against men. However, a significant 
minority of instances of mob violence do target women 
and, in several cases, Hindu upper or middle caste 
women are complicit in supporting male dominated 
mob violence against minority and oppressed groups. 
Keeping these issues in mind, we chose to gather data 
in: major metropolises, medium-sized cities, district 
headquarters, small towns and villages. 
Our research questions placed both the messages that 
are circulated and forwarded on WhatsApp or similar 
platforms (the texts), and those who receive, share, 
delete or report the messages (the users) centre stage. 
Our team carried out in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions with users. In order to triangulate 
opinions about culpability and responsibilities of 
government, mainstream media, technology companies 
(such as Facebook as the owners of WhatsApp), 
we also conducted interviews with experts working 
in fact-checking, law enforcement, academia, non-
governmental organisations and journalism. Over 
the course of our project conducted in 2019, our 
researchers interacted directly with approximately 275 
WhatsApp users through 65 in-depth interviews, 16 
focus group discussions and 10 expert interviews29. 
Further, we also looked at more than 1000 pieces 
of content that have circulated on WhatsApp. This 
content was anonymised and shared voluntarily by our 
respondents in line with the ethical guidelines of our 
project. Finally, we also reviewed disinformation fact-
checked by well-known initiatives in India, such as Boom 
Live and Alt News. 
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Having received permission from our departmental 
Research Ethics committee, and paying close attention 
to the data rights and confidentiality of participants, 
our research sought to investigate the political and 
cultural contexts within which disinformation is shared 
and consumed. End-to-end encryption makes it is 
difficult if not impossible for us as researchers to track 
who is producing disinformation and in what contexts. 
Our research therefore focuses on the practices of 
distribution and reception of disinformation, with 
the occasional admission by a user to having been 
the first poster of a particular piece of information/
30 Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985); Stuart Hall and 
Lawrence Grossberg, “On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall,” Journal of communication inquiry 10, no. 2 (1986): 45–60.
31 Joel D Aberbach and Bert A Rockman, “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,” Political Science and Politics 35, no. 4 (2002): 673–676; Greg Guest, 
Kathleen MacQueen, and Emily Namey, Applied Thematic Analysis (California: Sage Publications, 2012); Frances Montell, “Focus Group Interviews: A 
New Feminist Method,” NWSA 11, no. 1 (1999): 44–71; Kenneth J. Gergen, “Exploring the Postmodern: Perils or Potentials?,” American Psychologist 
49, no. 5 (1994): 412–416; RA Zeller, “Focus Group Research on Sensitive Topics: Setting the Agenda without Setting the Agenda,” in Successful 
Focus Groups: Advancing the State of the Art, ed. DL Morgan (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1993), 167–83; Thomas Lindlof and 
Bryan Taylor, Qualitative Communication Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2011).
misinformation. The emphasis is on how users 
experience, understand, participate in and subsequently 
articulate these practices30. The use of interviews and 
focus groups helps our informants to converse about 
sensitive topics either privately or in the presence 
of peers, and to bring to light shared and divergent 
perspectives on misinformation and measures to curb 
its spread31. The remainder of this report details findings 
based on the data we gathered.
Bhandardara, Maharashtra. Photo by Nihal Passanha.
15
Typology of Disinformation  
and Misinformation
As mentioned in the previous section, we have reviewed 
a large data set of information that circulates amongst 
WhatsApp users across four large Indian states. Since 
WhatsApp is a peer to peer and encrypted application, 
there is no way to gauge whether this is representative 
of all the information that circulates amongst users in 
these states, let alone India. Further, in the course of our 
research, participants showed us only those messages 
that they either received regularly, or information 
that they chose to forward for various reasons, or 
information that they chose to delete because it 
agitated or angered them in some way. We also 
compared the messages we saw from our respondents 
with the articles published by fact-checking initiatives 
who presumably counter disinformation that is going 
viral (based on users forwarding information for fact-
checking or based on judgment of editorial staff). Based 
on this, we propose a typology of disinformation and/or 
misinformation as per the table given below:
Type of Disinformation  
or misinformation  
Description of message   Outcome and Effects  
Overwhelming Content 
•  Accidents 
•  Dead Bodies 
•  Natural Disasters 
•  Unexplained Violence 
•  Group 
•  Individual.  
 •  Still and moving images of man 
exploding while mishandling explosives
•  Still and moving images with voice overs 
that purport to show child kidnapping, 
kidney snatching, braid-cutting
•  Still and moving images of industrial or 
agricultural accidents
•  Still and moving images of flooding, 
earthquakes, fires
•  Still and moving images of dead 
couples who have hanged themselves 
or been murdered
•  Still and moving images of road and  
rail accidents 
•  Still and moving images of the brutal 
lynching of individuals by mobs
•  Still and moving images of incidents of 
violence against children.
•  Provokes users into affective 
states (shock, awe, disgust, 
perverse fascination) that disrupt 
flows of daily life 
•  Promotes voyeurism of  
the spectacular
•  Undermines trust in mainstream, 
non-sensational media. Gives 
users a sense that mainstream 
media hides the real news that 
one can receive only on WhatsApp 
and other social media. 
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Type of Disinformation  
or misinformation  
Description of message   Outcome and Effects  
Nationalism/Ethno-religious 
bigotry 
•  Anti-Pakistan 
•  Anti-Kashmiri 
•  Anti-Muslim
•  Anti-Dalit 
•  Pro-Hindu 
•  Pro-BJP 
•  Pro-Modi 
•  Anti-Congress 
•  Anti-Rahul Gandhi 
•  Anti-Sonia Gandhi
•  Anti meat-eating.
 •  Written or mixed mode mockery of 
Pakistani military capabilities
•  Written, visual and/ or spoken 
questioning of the allegiance of 
Kashmiris to the idea of India
•  Memes, moving images and written 
texts implying Muslims responsible 
for population explosion
•  Still and moving images purporting to 
show Muslims praising Modi, praising 
BJP (including women praising Triple 
Talaq Bill)
•  Infographics and statistics praising 
Modi or BJP regime 
•  Speeches of Modi or images of Modi 
praising Modi
•  Written texts, memes, mixed mode 
messages, still and moving images 
accusing Rahul and Sonia Gandhi of 
arrogance (eg, for having old people 
touch their feet)
•  Clips from Rahul Gandhi speeches 
taken out of context and bracketed 
with Hindutva commentary
•  Notes suggesting that the Gandhi 
family has secret Muslim lineage.
 •  A feeling of militant nationalism 
that allows for no questioning 
or discussion
•  A feeling of false victimhood in 
conjunction with conspiratorial 
exaggeration of Muslims’ 
abilities, motives, resources
•  Physical violence against 
discriminated groups
•  Harassment through filing FIR at 
police stations
•  Bullying and intimidation of 
anyone who dares to question 
the status quo.
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Type of Disinformation  
or misinformation  
Description of message   Outcome and Effects  
Religious theme or ethno-
religious bigotry 
•  Hindutva/Hinduism 
•  Islam 
•  Christianity 
•  Sikhism.
 •  Oppression of Muslim women
•  Still and moving images of Hindu gurus 
(Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, Jaggi Vasudev, 
Baba Ramdev) defending their version of 
Hinduism or mocking other religions
•  Insulting lower-caste communities
•  Defending and celebrating Dalit and 
Adivasi leaders 
 •  Caste-based rituals and myths  
(jaati puranas)
•  Still and moving images of large Hindu 
religious marches or festivals (Kumbh 
Mela, Kanwariya procession)
•  Still and moving images purporting to 
show Muslims killing cattle or defiling 
Hindu idols or committing violence 
against Hindus or Muslim men luring 
and duping Hindu women in order to get 
them to marry and convert to Islam
•  Still and moving images of Muslims 
being attacked, apparently in revenge 
for something they have done (usually 
filmed and uploaded by the attackers).
•  Provides grandiose illusions about 
moral/ethical, historical superiority 
of one religion over others
•  Provides a religious/spiritual mode 
of explaining various aspects of 
daily life
•  Provides a sense of strength  
and power in one’s own  
religious community
•  Reinforces membership of 
religious community
•  Creates agitation, anger, anxiety, 
disgust and other emotions in 
users who then either share 
it or participate in violence 
(either immediate and/or anger 
accumulates for violence at a 
later point).
Gender 
• Sexual Violence 
• Misogyny 
• Patriarchal dictats.  
•  Still and moving images of women 
getting beaten by men
•  Still and moving images of dead 
women
•  Ideological metaphors with misogynist 
subtext: India-Pakistan conflict 
visualised as man raping woman
•  Jokes about women
•  Up skirt still and moving images
•  Pornography
•  Written rumours about loose 
character of women.
•  Intimidation and self-censorship
•  Fear of using technology
•  Policing of technology use  
by family
•  Blackmail and sexual violence 
(including rape)
•  Depression and withdrawal
•  Suicide.
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Type of Disinformation  
or misinformation  
Description of message   Outcome and Effects  
Miscellaneous (which do not 
contribute to violent outcomes, 
but are forwarded by the same 
people who forward violence 
producing misinformation).
•  Stills of farm produce, flowers, 
landscapes
•  Moving images of animals
•  Notes of images showing types of 
vegetables and recipes that can cure 
minor and serious health problems
•  Still and moving images of children 
singing or dancing from television shows 
•  Science-based moving image clips 
(usually demonstrating principles of 
physics through simple objects)
•  Short moving image clips with 
slapstick comedy (including many 
seemingly produced by Chinese users)
•  Spam text messages asking people 
to click links, or forward messages to 
others for money etc.
•  Provides the sense of everyday 
flow of content as background 
“noise” that is comforting, 
entertaining, “time pass” etc.
•  Serves as the raw material with 
which users construct online 
sociality (forwarding entertaining 
content to friends, religious 
content to family, motivational 
content to colleagues etc.)
•  Creates a sense of fatigue and 
overload that either leads users 
away from using the application, 
or bulk deleting messages, or 
having to “manage” memory of 
phone and SD card etc. 
•  Encourages users to indulge in 
uncritical forwarding of messages 
without checking the content.
Table 1: A typology of disinformation or misinformation shared on WhatsApp. 
It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive typology. 
Much of the messaging is responsive to daily political 
and social events. Many of the messages are focused 
on significant events such as elections or recent 
interreligious or caste unrest – such messages do not 
appear regularly. The above typology describes a small 
sample of the diverse varieties of misinformation and 
disinformation that we analysed during approximately six 
months of data collection. Different states have different 
genres of messages in vernacular languages. 
Some messages such as those against Muslims or 
alleged child-kidnappers have similar themes but adapt 
to the specific state and language (text/voiceover). 
Save for a few exceptions (in the miscellaneous and 
overwhelming categories), much of the disinformation 
is systematic – in terms of the consistency of delivery 
(the number of messages received daily, and over 
a period of time) as well as in the consistency of 
ideological propaganda (familiar stereotypes, anxieties, 
fearmongering against Muslims and “anti-nationals” or 
“secular” citizens). 
Figure 2: WhatsApp forwarded message comparing 
current prime minister Modi with ex-prime minister 
Manmohan Singh.
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The systematic aspect suggests that the production 
and distribution of much disinformation and 
misinformation in India has become institutionalised. 
Major political parties, and in particular the governing 
party, have a very sophisticated and well-established 
social infrastructure32 where messages can be 
centralised and disseminated at high speed, but which 
also allows for a) plausible deniability with regard to 
culpability for resulting violence; and b) a high level of 
32 “Real or Fake, We Can Make Any Message Go Viral: Amit Shah to BJP Social Media Volunteers,” The Wire, last modified 2018, accessed March 24, 
2019, thewire.in/politics/amit-shah-bjp-fake-social-media-messages
33 Amrita Madhukalya, “56-Hour Lag in Congress’s Reach on WhatsApp Gives BJP the Edge,” Hindustan Times, last modified 2019, accessed June 29, 
2019, hindustantimes.com/lok-sabha-elections/who-s-creating-whatsapp-buzz-this-election-season/story-NAewnMqSCqZlxtGlaelDhO.html
customised local content flourishing in accordance with 
local languages and interests. The institutionalisation 
suggests that far right ethno-religious groups with 
links to political parties, and political parties with 
an allegiance to the Hindutva agenda are using 
WhatsApp (and Facebook and multiple other social 
media channels) to disseminate propaganda without 
necessarily listing this dissemination infrastructure as a 
campaign or electoral expense33. 
Figure 3: WhatsApp forwarded message on current and ex-prime 
minister’s relationship with Obama.
Figure 4: WhatsApp forwarded message 
comparing Nehru and current prime minister Modi.
Figure 5: WhatsApp forwarded message 
comparing ex-prime minister of BJP, 
A.B. Vajpayee and Congress leader 
Rahul Gandhi.
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WhatsApp in India
34 swaniti.com 
WhatsApp started as a messaging start-up company in 
2009, and was soon picking up large numbers of users in 
many low and middle income countries including India. In 
2016 using the Signal protocol designed by Open Whisper 
Systems, WhatsApp initiated end-to-end encryption. As of 
2019, WhatsApp confirms that there are more than 400 million 
people in India using WhatsApp on a monthly basis. 
WhatsApp has played a significant role in the actions of 
those initiating and instigating mob violence, vigilantism 
and attempting to influence elections. This kind of usage 
stands in contrast to the stated intention of its creators as a 
messaging service between “friends” (those already in your 
phone contact list) rather than as a bulk messaging service. 
Bearing in mind the ways in which WhatsApp is currently 
being used and the consequences for democracy and 
citizens’ rights, WhatsApp has responded in two major areas 
– product design and literacy – in an attempt to curb what it 
construes as misuse of the App. 
WhatsApp has used a machine-based learning system that is 
intended to identify and thereafter ban accounts that engage 
in the bulk sharing of messages. Globally, (between December 
2018 and February 2019) this system is responsible for 
banning 2 million accounts per month. Our observations 
of users in India suggest that the efficacy of such bans is 
undermined by the ease with which users can obtain a new 
SIM card (often Jio SIM cards which are chosen for low-cost 
data) and then resume bulk-sharing on WhatsApp. In terms of 
product design, WhatsApp has introduced changes that they 
hope will disincentivise impersonal usage – for example, the 
bulk sharing of messages. These changes include the explicit 
labeling of messages as forwards, the limiting of forwards 
to five at one time, and the labeling of frequently forwarded 
messages. WhatsApp users can now choose not to be added 
to groups without their permission although this is not the 
default option. In the latest version of the app, administrators 
of groups can set permissions regarding which users can 
share messages and there will also be restrictions on users 
being added to groups repeatedly after they have left a group. 
Users will also have control over whether an unknown person 
(ie, a number not in their phone contact list) can add them to a 
group without their permission. 
In terms of literacy, WhatsApp has partnered with some 
civil society organisations such as Digital Empowerment 
Foundation (DEF) and with industry associations such as the 
National Association of Software and Service Companies 
(NASSCOM) to design and implement media literacy 
programmes in up to ten states. These programmes are 
intended to provide functional skills that have the potential 
to curb the sharing of disinformation – for example teaching 
about ways to check the veracity of an image by doing a 
reverse image search on a smartphone. These programmes 
also include focused literacy efforts during elections. 
WhatsApp also partnered with Swaniti34 Initiative to train 2600 
workers from nine political parties in nine states on using 
WhatsApp “responsibly”. In addition to these targeted literacy 
efforts, WhatsApp has used mainstream media and digital 
media distributors (including telecom service providers) to 
disseminate messages about media literacy in 11 different 
Indian languages. The key slogan for this campaign is 
“Share Joy, Not Rumours”. Finally, during the recent general 
elections in India, WhatsApp introduced a “tip-line” developed 
in partnership with Indian start-up companies, where users 
could forward a message on WhatsApp to be fact-checked. 
The content and scale of such literacy efforts are distinct from 
considerations of how effective they are at changing the social, 
political and cultural ideas and values that we have found to be 
fundamental to the sharing of misinformation, disinformation 
and related hate-speech in India. 
As many of these are rather recent initiatives, and are 
responding to some of the same events that prompted our 
research, we did not set out to measure the success or failure 
of these efforts by the company in India, but rather to gauge 
the ways in which such efforts become integrated into the 
wider social, civic and political communications system 
amongst average users across different states. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is also no specific information on 
the overall changes in patterns of use in India. After product 
changes with respect to the forwarding of messages, 
WhatsApp estimates that there has been a 25 per cent 
decrease in bulk messaging globally. Further, statistics from 
WhatsApp suggest that it remains predominantly a messaging 
service between individuals, with nine out of ten messages 
moving between individuals and WhatsApp groups tending to 
be on average below ten members. Even though this in itself is 
interesting, we note that given the scale of WhatsApp usage in 
India (400 million and growing), specifically in the case of mob 
violence, deliberate and targeted abuse of the application even 
by a minority of users has life-threatening consequences for 
vulnerable groups.
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Affordances, Platforms and Infrastructures
35 Since April 2019, WhatsApp has introduced options where if chosen users cannot be added to groups without their permission. See PTI, “Now You 
Can Choose If You Want to Be Added to a WhatsApp Group,” The New Indian Express, last modified 2019, accessed May 28, 2019, newindianexpress.
com/lifestyle/tech/2019/apr/03/now-you-can-choose-if-you-want-to-be-added-to-a-whatsapp-group-1959784.html
36 Rachna Khaira, “Rs 500, 10 Minutes, and You Have Access to Billion Aadhaar Details,” The Tribune, January 4, 2018, accessed July 26, 2019, 
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html; Tech2 News Staff, “Aadhaar 
Security Breaches: Here Are the Major Untoward Incidents That Have Happened with Aadhaar and What Was Actually Affected,” Firstpost, last 
modified 2018, accessed July 26, 2019, firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/aadhaar-security-breaches-here-are-the-major-untoward-incidents-
that-have-happened-with-aadhaar-and-what-was-actually-affected-4300349.html
Rural areas in India are still largely served by 2G 
infrastructure, and this is even sometimes the case in 
small towns with populations of over 300,000 people as 
these quotes illustrate:
...We have totally no network zones in rural area, 
some parts of rural are exceptional, somewhere 
they have range (network coverage)
...We use ShareIt, we share movies to each other, 
boys download movies when they come into the 
city and give it to others.
...We go where we can get range, we go to the roof 
of people’s house where we get range.
Focus group discussion with middle-aged male 
WhatsApp users in Chandrapur, Maharashtra
In addition to its other affordances, WhatsApp also 
enables groups to form and to communicate without 
fear of their information being tracked. Following 
changes made by WhatsApp, each group can have up 
to a maximum of 256 members. There is no limit on 
the number of groups that any given person can belong 
to. Adding users to a group is also relatively easy for 
the group administrator. The only metadata required in 
order to add a user to a group is their mobile number35. 
When a subscriber registers for a SIM card, it is issued 
after the provision of a subscriber’s Unique biometric 
identification information or Aadhaar number. Several 
investigations36 have revealed that the database of 
subscribers can easily be purchased on the black 
market and circulates to a wide range of clients – 
from commercial advertisers interested in specific 
markets (for example, rural college-going students) 
to political parties (for example, subscribers from a 
specific ward or constituency). Further, many users 
themselves have enthusiastically adopted practices 
of group communication. This reflects pre-existing 
dynamics where informal and formal social groups 
have simply extended their presence onto WhatsApp. 
Neighbourhood associations, caste associations, 
political parties, charities, health interests, friendship 
groups, religious affiliations, professional associations 
or ties, and pro-government groups all existed 
before WhatsApp entered India, and now continue 
on WhatsApp as well, albeit with further features 
associated with online communities, such as the ability 
to dip in and dip out of many more groups than would 
be possible in face-to-face circumstances. 
HH: I am part of every political party WhatsApp 
group. BJP, Congress, RPI. In my mobile I am 
member of around 300 to 350 WhatsApp groups. 
I am part of reporters, newspapers, state political 
groups, groups of people we meet for work, health 
related, doctor’s group. 
Focus group discussion with male and female 
middle-aged users in Chandrapur, Maharashtra
I am part of every political party WhatsApp group. BJP, 
Congress, RPI. In my mobile I am member of around 
300 to 350 WhatsApp groups. I am part of reporters, 
newspapers, state political groups, groups of people 
we meet for work, health related, doctor’s group.  
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BB: I am part of a work group, school group, best 
friends’ group, college group, master’s group, work 
friends’ group, family group. There are so many 
groups, I don’t even remember them all. I would be 
a member of about 18-25 groups on WhatsApp. 
I started a friends’ group. I am not admin on any 
other group. I get diverse content on groups. 
Memes, general information, election-political 
things, news, fake news, jokes, poems, good 
morning, good night messages. 
In-depth interview with 28-year-old female  
user in Dewas, Madhya Pradesh
CB: Known people add you to the group. For 
example, the other day I went to BJP office here for 
some work. When I went there they said, arre bhaiya 
[hey, brother] please give your WhatsApp number, 
so I gave it. And within five to seven minutes he 
immediately added me to a party group. 
Focus group discussion with middle-aged male 
users in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
ED: ...Sometimes if we go to some event, they tell 
you that they are planning similar event someplace 
else, that is why they need to add you to a group. 
Someone might give my number to someone else 
if they need me to work with them on some project 
or campaign. Sometimes you also give out phone 
numbers if you’re registering for some event or 
program and then you get added to WhatsApp 
groups. 
Focus group discussion with middle-aged male 
users in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
The encryption of information, the peer-to-peer nature 
of the network, and the group architecture that the 
cross-platform messaging service enables are crucial 
aspects of WhatsApp: these are affordances that play 
an important role in the spread of disinformation. 
RR: As an app, through its design, it has enabled 
closed communication and mass communication. 
By mass I mean that you are reaching hundreds 
and thousands of people; if a group has 250 people, 
you can have 10 groups in your region and you 
have more than thousand people right then and 
there with one message and no one is ever going 
to know who started that chain of messages or 
who is the one who actually posted that. So, it has 
enabled that kind of communication where there is 
no accountability to the content posted and there 
is zero transparency on where the messages are 
emanating from. The trust factor that WhatsApp 
inherently carried because it was meant to be an 
end-to-end communication app has then been 
used in different contexts to actually spread a lot of 
misinformation and disinformation.
Expert Interview with journalist in  
Mumbai, Maharashtra
WhatsApp has introduced several technical changes 
to the application that seek to curb the sharing of 
misinformation and disinformation. The underlying logic 
of these changes is to introduce friction that reduces 
the rapid sharing of mis- and disinformation. These 
include: adding options where users cannot be added 
to groups without permission, introducing limits to 
the number of members in a given group, introducing 
limits to mass forwarding and so on. However, we 
discovered that by and large younger users use a range 
of unauthorised versions of WhatsApp that can be 
downloaded and used on the Android operating system 
in India, such as WhatsApp plus or WhatsApp GB and 
so on. Users who want these unauthorised versions are 
easily able to find explanatory videos on YouTube about 
how to download, install and use such unauthorised 
versions which allow them the functionality of older 
versions of WhatsApp such as mass forwarding and 
adding people to groups without permission. 
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PF: We mostly use WhatsApp GB because it has 
more features.
Focus group discussion with young men,  
Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh
AG: I had used this app. It was like a blue 
WhatsApp. It would send notifications when anyone 
comes online and we could download people’s 
statuses also through that. I used it only 2 months 
and then I stopped using it. A friend of mine had put 
a status about this and I liked it so she had shared 
it with me. I was attracted to the colours and it was 
also a nice feature that I could download the videos 
and photos that people put as their status. 
Focus group discussion with young men  
and women, Dharwad, Karnataka
Nor is this use of unauthorised versions (to work-around 
WhatsApp misinformation fixes) a problem confined 
to individual users. Unauthorised versions can be 
downloaded along with various other mass-distribution 
software and mass-distribution websites that enable 
political parties to weaponise WhatsApp against the 
political opposition and against vulnerable minority 
groups and dissenters. As we mentioned at the end 
of the previous section, such unauthorised software 
can be plugged into large scale social infrastructures 
37 Sankalp Phartiyal and Aditya Kalra, “Despite Being Exposed, Fake News Thrives on Social Media Ahead of India Polls,” Reuters, last modified 2019, 
accessed May 18, 2019, reuters.com/article/india-election-socialmedia-fakenews/despite-being-exposed-fake-news-thrives-on-social-media-
ahead-of-india-polls-idUSKCN1RE08Z
38 Stopping Abuse: How WhatsApp Fights Bulk Messaging and Automated Behavior, previously available at: whatsapp.com/safety/WA_
StoppingAbuse_Whitepaper_020418_Update.pdf. Link taken down. 
39 Vidya Narayanan et al., News and Information over Facebook and WhatsApp during the Indian Election Campaign (Oxford, 2019), accessed 
September 9, 2019, comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/05/India-memo.pdf; Sreenivasan Jain and Manas Pratap Singh, 
“Exclusive: The ‘Silver Touch’ Behind BJP’s Online Dominance?,” NDTV, last modified 2017, accessed September 9, 2019, ndtv.com/india-news/
exclusive-silver-touch-behind-bjps-online-dominance-1766114; Ualan Campbell-Smith and Samantha Bradshaw, Global Cyber Troops Country 
Profile: India (Oxford, 2019), accessed September 9, 2019, comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/05/India-Profile.pdf
for the production and distribution of propaganda37. 
In order to address the institutionalised bulk sharing 
of messages, WhatsApp has introduced a machine-
based learning system in early 2019. It has been 
widely reported that this system bans approximately 2 
million accounts a month globally, although real time 
data for India is not available38. While an automated 
system to ban abusive behaviour might be necessary 
given the volume and scale of bulk messaging, it is not 
clear whether such efforts have been successful in 
preventing various forms of bulk messaging – including 
mis and disinformation by the government, and political 
parties39. The authors of this report encountered 
individuals who were directly involved in bulk-messaging 
during the 2019 Indian elections. Although outside the 
scope of this report, this aspect of persistent WhatsApp 
misuse warrants ongoing in-depth research. 
A complex configuration of infrastructures that include 
platforms, cross-platform apps and their affordances, 
and also relatively affordable access to data and a 
fall in the cost of smartphones are all factors in the 
increasingly rapid spread of misinformation and 
disinformation in India. This can be said without 
attributing causality to any infrastructures or 
affordances. However, a statement such as this does 
raise questions of liability, responsibility and regulation. 
We will turn to these issues later in the report. 
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Transmediality and Intertextuality
40 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 95–96.
41 Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 66.
42 Johanna Deeksha, “#ArrestShehlaRashid Trends on Twitter after Army Slams Her Allegations of Harassment in Kashmir,” Edex Live, last modified 
2019, accessed August 29, 2019, edexlive.com/news/2019/aug/19/arrestshehlarashid-trends-on-twitter-after-army-slams-her-allegations-of-
harassment-in-kashmir-7521.html
In this section, we deal with two terms – transmediality 
which can be defined as non-media specific stories 
or phenomena “that unfold across multiple media 
platforms, with each text making a distinctive and 
valuable contribution to the whole” 40 and intertextuality 
which refers to the ways in which “each text is an 
intersection with other texts where at least one other 
text can be read... ”41. Our analysis of the data suggests 
that both are important components in the spread of 
false or misleading information, partial information, 
misinformation and disinformation that have led to 
mobs and lynchings in India. 
In terms of transmediality, there are several parallel 
stereotypes and narratives that originate, for instance, 
in speeches from leading politicians of the BJP. These 
are to do with defending the day-to-day activities of 
the government and/or with attacking dissenters, 
and are usually articulated either by politicians or 
by party spokespersons who appear in mainstream 
media outlets. These narratives are then immediately 
supported by televised “debates” that take place 
at primetime on all the top English and Hindi news 
channels. These clips usually attack any opposition to 
the current government and simultaneously defend or 
support the government. These so-called debates are 
accompanied by suggestive hashtags. These hashtags 
are borrowed from social media activity and sometimes 
social media borrows from television. 
On social media sites, there are thousands of social 
media accounts that use a template-driven or cookie-
cutter attacks on any politically critical or dissenting 
social media user. The post, or tweet, uses exactly 
the same language and set of hashtags. The aim is to 
influence the algorithms of social media, ie, to suggest 
that a topic has “genuinely” sparked conversation. In 
addition, there are well known celebrities who then post 
tweets using these hashtags, and as a result, within 
a few hours these hashtags start trending – thereby 
achieving viral status42. This viral status further provides 
impetus for the topic to be viewed as newsworthy, and 
one around which polls and debates can be conducted. 
Significant events, such as India’s air strikes against 
Pakistan following the Pulwama attack or events in 
Kashmir can be linked to all of the above-mentioned 
ultra-nationalist narratives and transmedia practices. 
Figure 6: WhatsApp forwarded message of 
a tweet demanding arrest of Shehla Rashid.
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For example, during the recent abrogation of Article 
370 and 35A of the Indian constitution providing 
autonomy for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a 
prominent young activist from Kashmir, Shehla Rashid 
sent out several tweets on the 18th of August, 2019. 
In these tweets, she reported events transpiring in 
Kashmir based on conversations with local residents43. 
Rashid described a breakdown in delivery of public 
services and infrastructure, and instances of violence, 
torture and harassment within a camp set up by the 
Indian army. Within two days, a hashtag started by 
government supporters was trending on Twitter - 
#ArrestShehlaRashid (see Figure 1), and a lawyer 
practicing in the Supreme Court had filed a Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL) alleging that Rashid had 
deliberately spread disinformation to incite disaffection 
against the Indian army and government44. At the time 
of writing this report, prominent television channels 
such as CNN-News 18 ran a poll (see Figure 2) asking 
viewers/users to weigh in on whether Rashid should 
be arrested45 while another television channel Republic 
TV ran programmes with a hashtag #TwitterQuitIndia 
alleging that the social media company is biased 
against India and because it was not willing to delete 
Shehla Rashid’s tweets about Kashmir46. 
43 See twitter.com/Shehla_Rashid/status/1162974916250988545. Last accessed on 21st August, 2019. Note also that very similar footage and 
reports had already been aired by the BBC and other international news organisations.
44 “Criminal Complaint against Shehla Rashid under Sedition Charges, Lawyer Seeks Arrest,” The News Minute, last modified 2019, accessed August 
20, 2019, thenewsminute.com/article/criminal-complaint-against-shehla-rashid-under-sedition-charges-lawyer-seeks-arrest-107456
45 Vijayta Lalwani, “‘The Government Is a Bully’: Shehla Rashid on Why She Tweeted Information She Could Not Verify,” Scroll, last modified 2019, accessed 
August 20, 2019, scroll.in/article/934536/the-government-is-a-bully-shehla-rashid-on-why-she-tweeted-information-she-could-not-verify
46 twitter.com/republic/status/1163488208694337538. Last accessed on August 20, 2019. 
At the time of our data collection, the 2019 Balakot 
airstrikes (see Timeline of the Pulawama and Balakot 
Attacks on page 48) had only recently taken place, and 
were fresh in the minds of WhatsApp users with whom 
we interacted. 
I: Did you get any video on Pulwama?
P: Yes, I got four videos during that time and three 
of them were fake. I saw on YouTube. One video 
was even Chinese. 
Q: There were also a lot of speculations on how 
many terrorists had died [in the Balakot revenge 
airstrikes]. I had heard 300 to 350 had died.
P: Amit Shah had said it was 352.
V: We all had put WhatsApp statuses/ WhatsApp 
story that day.
I: Did you question any of the information you were 
provided during that time?
P: No at that time, we mostly believed everything 
we were told because it was a matter of patriotism.
I: And now?
P: I still believe that most of it was true. 
Focus group discussion with young and  
middle-aged men in Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh
Even though there are many unanswered questions, 
for example about the intelligence failure that lead to 
the suicide explosions that killed Indian army personnel 
in Kashmir, the government along with mainstream 
media support diverted all public discussion towards 
questions about how many terrorists could be or were 
killed in the retaliation attack, and more broadly, to view 
the whole Pulwama terrorism incident through the 
lens of unquestioning nationalism. As the above quote 
shows, WhatsApp users have internalised definitions of 
patriotism as uncritical and accepting of government 
actions and narratives, and proceed to operationalise 
these understandings into practice via their WhatsApp 
Figure 7: WhatsApp forwarded message of a television 
channel poll on arresting Shehla Rashid.
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statuses, WhatsApp stories and so on. These practices 
in effect, constitute transmediality where the narrative of 
patriotism-in-times-of-crisis is conveyed via different texts 
across different media, making a distinctive contribution 
to historical and social understandings of events. 
We also found that WhatsApp messages, especially 
disinformation, circulates intertextually. For example, 
the current Indian government led by Prime Minister 
Modi has prided itself on its emphasis on the speed 
and scale of performance on a series of infrastructure 
related developments. The Prime Minister himself 
has emphasised statistics and numbers that appear 
to provide the objective truth about the efficiency, 
transparency and honesty of his government. These 
speeches are then simultaneously translated into 
neat infographic-style posters that are circulated on 
social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram. They can be and are easily downloaded and 
shared on WhatsApp. In each of these posters, apart 
from the information itself, the texts reveal the use of 
falsified or contested quantitative (statistics-based) 
(dis)information that is assumed to have a higher truth 
status than just writing or images. As the figure below 
illustrates, the presentation of statistics as objective truth 
is aimed at an urban middle class audience, presumed 
to be ethical tax-paying citizens who can expect efficient 
“customer service” from the government.  
Figure 8: WhatsApp forwarded message using the genre of statistics-based truth-claims.
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Media Literacy
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48 AltNews and Boom Live are two of the most well-know and widely respected fact-checking organisations in India. Both of them have their own 
websites, dedicated helpline, and regularly dispel disinformation on various social media websites. Recently, AltNews has released a mobile app on 
the Android operating system. 
The notion of media literacy has been around since at 
least the 1930s. Initially, literacy was used in a protectionist 
sense as most media users were seen to be passive 
victims. Over time, literacy has expanded to position 
itself as a vital requirement for participatory democracy, 
especially given the rapid rise and influence of networked 
communication technologies in many aspects of life. In 
the expanded notion of media literacy belong two broad 
distinctions – functional media literacy and critical 
media literacy. Functional media literacy emphasises the 
individual media user’s skills and capacity to use various 
media – including the technical properties and affordances 
of information and communication technologies such as 
smart-phones and apps. Critical media literacy emphasises 
the intersection of skills and capacities with understandings 
of ideology, political economy and other forms of power as 
well as the notion of an active audience that participates 
in the struggle to make meaning of any given text 47. 
Following narratives about the seemingly unpredictable 
and uncontrollable instances of violence linked to use 
of platforms and cross-platform Apps like WhatsApp, 
Facebook and TikTok, civil society institutions and groups 
have focused on a functional approach to media literacy. 
F: We tell them immediately when you receive an 
information you should verify. Google is the easiest 
way by which you can verify an information and you 
should always verify it from multiple sources not 
just from one source. And then there’s this image 
reverse search. So, we tell them about that. If there 
is a photograph which is questionable and you can 
always verify the authenticity of the photography by 
doing the image reverse search. And then we tell them 
about these Alt News and Boom Live fact checking 
organisations. So nowadays deep fakes are there are 
videos which can be doctored and they are doctored 
so well that you cannot tell the authenticity of the video 
just by looking at it. The words are being artificially put 
in the mouths of well-known people and it’s done so 
well that you cannot tell just by looking at the video, it’s 
very difficult to tell that it’s doctored. So, if that is the 
case and it’s not possible to verify it through Google 
and through other means then it’s always good to get 
in touch with Alt News and Boom Live48 who have a 
skilled team who will be able to verify that video for you 
and share it with you. 
Interview with senior staff from civil society 
organisation in Delhi
Our interviewee worked for a civil society organisation that 
had devised two strategies as part of its media literacy 
work. One was a training module on behavioural patterns 
while the other module attempted to promote a culture of 
verification amongst users. The above extract from the 
interview refers to the latter module. Put together, these 
modules fall somewhere between functional and critical 
media literacy. We believe that functional media literacy is 
useful and should be continued. 
GT: There’s a huge difference [between a WhatsApp 
story and a message]. That day I was just leaving my 
house, when I saw the news [referring to the Pulwama 
suicide attack] so I had very little time. I clicked a 
photo when I saw it and put a story. Before that very 
few people had put a story about this incident. People 
can view stories very quickly. I feel that people only 
put stories when they feel that it is something very 
important and they put their own thoughts into it. 
[However] if you’re forwarding messages, you can hide 
your feelings. People can question and debate on your 
stories with you personally. But if you are forwarding 
messages, especially if it’s an opinion or a rumour, it 
spreads very quickly. People can interpret things in 
different ways. Sometimes they don’t even read the 
entire message and just forward it. This way, wrong 
things spread very quickly. I don’t usually send anything 
to people easily. WhatsApp even has an ad now, “share 
joy, not rumours”.
HP: Now WhatsApp has done a good thing; a 
message that has been forwarded will say that it has 
been forwarded. Most messages people get these 
days are forwarded. Very few are typed by  
the senders. One of the biggest demerits in my opinion 
is that people forward messages without  
a second thought. 
Focus group discussion with male and female social 
work students, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
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Even though functional literacy is useful and necessary 
it is not sufficient. As the quote from the civil society 
representative suggests, there are a handful of fact 
checking organisations who manage to publish fact-
checking reports on a daily basis. However, the fact-
checking industry has limited options for raising funds 
and recruitment, especially during significant periods 
such as the recently concluded general elections in May 
2019. Further, functional literacy efforts are necessarily 
limited by the technical affordances provided by 
platforms such as WhatsApp and those provided by 
the device (usually smart phones) on which the user is 
accessing information or disinformation. 
I: Is there anything that you would not pass on?
(Several at once) Most of it. don’t have time. It’s just 
for information. Just words and greetings. 
VP: Anything that shows accidents, rape, I don’t think 
we should show that. It is creating a bad impression. 
DS: There’s one person in one of the groups who is 
always trying to stir troubles. I don’t share his posts. 
I: For example? 
DS: He posted that Why was Modiji not stopping 
Pulwama? Why was govt. allowing that attack? We 
threatened him. Stop that talk or get out. 
I: Do you mean that the person who started the 
group told him off for stating his opinion? 
DS: For making up lies. All of us group members. 
Even if that is his “opinion”, still shut up, don’t 
make a fight when you have no fact to show. 
Just keep quiet or just go to Pakistan and live 
there. Government is working hard. The country 
was attacked. We have to attack them (Pakistan, 
terrorist) in return. 
I to VP: You we’re worried about a bad impression? 
VP: Yes, in the mind. I delete posts that is disturbing 
to thoughts. We should all do that. I would not 
forward such things. Especially on women. 
BL: I don’t forward. I save a screenshot if something 
is really very bad and I discuss with my husband 
that what should we do?
I: Like? For example? 
BL: I am in a WhatsApp group of the kids (teenage) 
my daughters. Sometimes there is these posts on 
challenges, like do this (thing to make you sexy) 
and then you will get guys, pass it on if you agree, 
etc. But mostly I know they already have this kind of 
thing in Instagram. I am very careful. I check their 
phones every morning before they get up. 
Mumbai, Maharashtra, Hindu and Jain  
housewives focus group discussion
This extended excerpt clearly shows that these educated 
urban women, whose primary concern seems to be their 
families, children and communities, are functionally very 
media literate. They can check their children’s Instagram 
accounts and make screenshots; they are all in multiple 
groups, and they curate the flow of messages coming 
from these based on how the messages make them feel 
or relate to their values and beliefs. 
So, functional media literacy suggests that users 
engage in sharing disinformation only because they 
do not know the facts or because of a lack the literacy 
required to verify the information. However, as our 
research demonstrates, users share disinformation, 
act to suppress discussion that could lead to 
the identification of disinformation, and forward 
misinformation out of diverse motivations including 
pre-existing prejudice against specific communities, a 
People can question and debate on your stories with 
you personally. But if you are forwarding messages, 
especially if it’s an opinion or a rumour, it spreads very 
quickly. People can interpret things in different ways. 
Sometimes they don’t even read the entire message 
and just forward it.  
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belief in a particular (nationalist, religious) ideology, and 
pre-existing loyalty to political parties and government 
ministers. In such cases, functional literacy is of 
little help in preventing the spread of misinformation 
since even technically savvy users are willing to share 
disinformation and misinformation as long as it aligns 
with their values, beliefs and ideological convictions. 
Our findings suggest that younger and middle-aged 
users have various informal self-learned or socially 
learned notions of digital literacy that straddle the line 
between functional and critical literacy. As a direct 
result of the overt and overwhelming bias in favour 
of the BJP shown across electronic media in India 
but paradoxically also influenced by information and 
misinformation about the lack of trustworthiness 
of opposition politicians, some younger users we 
interviewed mention decreased trust in television as 
a source of authentic and accurate information, while 
turning instead to online applications and platforms 
such as WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook etc. 
L: ...Media is only business! Awareness is not their 
[Television journalists’] motive (for news). They 
want to increase their Television Rating Points 
(TRP) only. Media is tied with any party; they are not 
working for society. They show only news which 
political party want to bombard. Their work is to be 
neutral and show truth. They are not doing it. 
Focus group discussion with college  
students in Pune, Maharashtra
G: I also received a lot of fake videos and news 
when the Pulwama attack happened. More of our 
soldiers had died than we were told.
I: How do you know this?
G: Different news channels (Aaj Tak, Zee News) 
were quoting different numbers. Newspapers were 
showing different numbers. Most people think that 
the news on TV is always true but it is not so. 
Focus group discussion with young  
women in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
Despite this avowed distrust of televised broadcast 
news, we found clear connections between news 
channels on television and news clips or footage 
consumed on WhatsApp and other social media. 
Many of the television news debates borrow from 
the top trending topics on social media, and on many 
occasions, users come across information on social 
media or platforms like WhatsApp and then watch 
television to cross-verify it. 
RO: I saw it first on Facebook. I also have Jio TV 
so I checked the news and even that was showing 
coverage of Pulwama. If someone receives news 
of an important event on Facebook or WhatsApp, 
they will definitely check the news on TV or read the 
newspaper to verify it. 
Focus group discussion with male and female 
students in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
Figure 9: WhatsApp campaign to curb spread  
of misinformation.
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For messages that contain no overt ideological content 
or are ambiguous, some users tend to display a sense 
of scepticism and have a set of techniques to verify 
whether a received message might be false 
NO: I recently got a picture of a woman who was 
begging on the road. She had a small child on her 
lap. The woman was wearing old tattered clothing 
but the child on her lap was well dressed and 
seemed to be from a rich family. Everyone instantly 
thought it was a case of kidnapping. But if you 
zoomed in on the photo, you’ll find that the child 
was edited into the photo.  
Focus group discussion with  
middle aged men’s group in Bhopal
KL: When Abhinandan [the Indian air force pilot who 
crash-landed across the border in Pakistan, was 
captured and later released by Pakistan] came back, 
at that time Pakistan shared a video of him. People 
had differing opinions on that as well. I don’t want 
to say much about it as it is contentious. I believed 
the video for what it was when I first saw it. But 
later when I saw it on the news, it had 20 or 21 cuts. 
Something like that can change your point of view 
within a day. If a video has that many cuts, it can’t 
be original. 
Focus group discussion with college  
students, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
Moving away, momentarily, from messages that lead to 
violence, several of the younger users we interviewed 
recognised specific messages that by their very genre 
indicated that the message was not from a reliable 
source. For instance, spam messages soliciting money:
SB: ...sometimes fake companies like to attract 
students, they get our numbers from somewhere 
like sometimes from our friends they get number; 
they send messages like “give 15000, 20000 [rupees], 
make more money” and all. And everyone is doing 
all things for earning bread only. When I came here 
I got messages like this “Earn maximum amount of 
money in very less time”; they got our numbers from 
our friends. They do this to attract people. 
Focus group discussion with male  
students in Pune University, Maharashtra
On the other hand, other users struggle to reconcile 
the spread of disinformation with the sociability upon 
which WhatsApp draws. Many users expressed to us 
that they struggle to see how something can be fake 
or fraudulent if a trusted friend of many years has 
forwarded it to them. 
Figure 10: WhatsApp campaign, Share Joy not Rumours.
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Younger users showed awareness of the possibilities 
that exist for manipulating still and moving-image 
footage and, by corollary, the claims attached to these 
types of manipulated footage. The reason for their 
awareness according to them is that many of them 
receive messages on a daily basis containing news or 
assertions that they recognise as misinformation based 
on their own life experiences. 
GT: When the photos are edited, you can make 
out easily that it is fake. I will tell you about a funny 
incident that happened with my friend. So, a friend 
of mine put a photo of another friend saying “rest in 
peace”. They had planned it and the person whose 
photo was put up purposely didn’t receive anyone’s 
calls for a whole day. I knew about this and people 
would call me also asking about this, so I did not know 
what to say in that situation. If such a post is put up by 
a government account, we tend to believe it. 
Focus group discussion with young male  
students in Dharwad, Karnataka
We were also given examples of the recognition of 
misinformation such as news received on WhatsApp 
about riots or incidents purporting to be in their own 
region, circulated with stills or moving images from 
other regions. However, scepticism about one message 
does not necessarily extend to a more systematic 
scepticism about the validity of other messages 
circulating on WhatsApp. Functional digital literacy 
about some features does not necessarily equate with 
or convert into broader critical digital literacy. 
Disinformation is produced to increasingly high 
standards, and circulated in complex formats that play 
with modality and genre.
TT: Many a times you get lynching videos with 
text written with it. Just by watching the video one 
doesn’t get to know who is beating who for what 
reason. It is the text sent along with the video that 
gives you context. Many a time I have seen the same 
video being sent in different contexts. For example, 
the two men who were lynched in north-east [for 
alleged child-kidnapping], [Those who circulate] will 
use the same video again later with some other 
context like [those men] were disrespecting Bharat 
Mata [Mother India] or something. 
Interview with female NGO worker  
in Dewas, Madhya Pradesh
Our analysis of the data gathered for this research 
consistently suggests users’ motivations and 
ideological biases can come into conflict with their 
functional digital literacy. Social contexts of dislike, envy, 
contempt and hatred against Dalits, Muslims and other 
minority groups, overwhelm the potential of many forms 
of media and digital literacy to prevent the spread of 
disinformation. Indeed, digital skills and functional media 
literacy allied to strong ideological prejudices and hatred 
against the other can assist the spread of disinformation, 
and sometimes be the trigger for misinformation.
Users share disinformation, act to suppress discussion that 
could lead to identification of disinformation, and forward 
misinformation out of diverse motivations including pre-existing 
prejudice against specific communities, a belief in a particular 
(nationalist, religious) ideology, and pre-existing loyalty to 
individuals, political parties and government ministers.  
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Gendered Usage of WhatsApp 
As discussed in the previous section, media literacy and 
digital skills are no prophylactic against misinformation, 
sometimes quite the contrary as they can be used in the 
service of broader systems of power and inequality. An 
acute example of this is gendered access to smartphones 
and their usage by women. 
A: We have three mobile phones at home but only 
one of them is smart phone. I rarely use the smart 
phone, mostly children use it, I hardly use the phone. 
Our children watch cartoon shows, songs on the 
phone. I don’t know how to put all this on phone. 
B: I don’t have a phone with me, my husband keeps 
the phone all the time. 
C: I only have the basic phone at home, nobody has 
smart phone in our house. My son taught me how to 
use this basic phone. We never had any phone in our 
house before. 
D: For me somebody usually makes the call and 
hands me the phone, so I don’t know to how to make 
a call or receive a call. I just talk on it. 
E: If I ever have my own phone, I will first learn how to 
use WhatsApp. How to send photos and videos. 
F: We have three smartphones and two basic 
phones at home. I only use to make or receive calls, 
I don’t touch it otherwise. I can play a video on the 
phone, can open a game, can see a photo, can see 
what has come on WhatsApp but don’t know how to 
send anything. 
G: I know that one can see videos on WhatsApp. Our 
brothers usually have smartphones, so we don’t see 
or use it much, only when the phone is at home, we 
use it at times. People send videos of some functions 
or cartoons on WhatsApp. People send photos for 
wishing good morning or festivals. These are the 
ones I also forward to others. 
Focus group discussion with middle aged  
women in Nindanpur, Uttar Pradesh
R: Initially, it was very difficult. Then my brother 
taught me how to send photos. But I don’t know 
how to type in English.
S: It was tough to know how to save numbers. 
Before, I never knew if it was my mother or brother or 
anyone else who was calling. Now I know because of 
caller ID. 
Focus group discussion with women  
in Daliganj, Uttar Pradesh
Y: I was using simple phone, we got this phone from 
organisation, so viju bhau taught me that how to use 
it. Calling someone and picking someone’s call was 
easy but I learnt typing messages.
Z: My son taught me how to use it. 
Focus group discussion with men and  
women in Chandrapur, Maharashtra
Our analysis of focus group data suggests that women, 
particularly in small towns and rural areas, frequently do 
not have any or unfettered access to smartphones. If they 
do have access, it is either monitored by a male member 
of their family or curtailed by their limited functional digital 
literacy. As the above quotes show, in some cases, male 
users in their families or networks help women access 
and use smartphones. However, we also heard that men’s 
digital literacy has adverse consequences when allied to 
misogynist practices. 
OO: Some boy from my college had taken my photo 
from WhatsApp. I don’t know how he got my number 
and then he put my photo beside some other person’s 
photo. My brother saw that and asked me who that 
was. I had no clue who that was and then we had to 
take a screenshot and got his account blocked. That’s 
why I use my phone only to talk to my friends and 
only for 2 hours per day. I use only WhatsApp. And I 
am so scared that I don’t put my photo anywhere.
TP: I got a video on WhatsApp where a girl had 
shared a video on TikTok but she hadn’t worn 
underwear and without her knowledge, her private 
parts were showing. I told my friend to delete the 
video and I searched for the girl’s ID on TikTok and 
informed her about this. But by that time, it had 
already reached a lot of people. 
Focus group discussion with middle-aged  
women in Daliganj, Uttar Pradesh
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GA: Two years back, in Chappra village, an obscene 
video was made of the [rape of an accredited social 
health activist] worker and was circulated – she 
committed suicide after that or she was murdered, I 
don’t know; but she died after that video became viral 
on WhatsApp. 
Interview with employee in a mobile phone 
services shop, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh49
QP: [P]eople add you to groups without your 
permission sometimes. Once someone added me 
to a BJP WhatsApp group and someone sent a 
pornographic image on it recently. People called 
him out on it. I also commented on it, women and 
men both are part of the group, how can he send 
something like this on the group? I told everyone in 
the group to either remove me from the group or 
send only decent stuff on the group. If you want to 
send such stuff to someone then send it personally 
to them, why send it on a group? 
Focus group discussion with men and women  
in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
As these experiences show, women often experience 
smartphone use as a domain carrying high risks. They 
have to negotiate between the patriarchal protection 
and surveillance of the men and older women in their 
immediate families, the attention of strangers who 
49 The details of this tragic case have been widely discussed in the media, pointing to the ubiquity of rape culture in India; the implication of WhatsApp 
to circulate viral rape videos made by perpetrators; and the patriarchal ways in which women bear the brunt of the social stigma attached to rape: 
thequint.com/news/india/muzaffarnagar-asha-worker-commits-suicide-after-rape-clip-shared 
50 Japleen Pasricha, “Violence” Online In India: Cybercrimes against Women and Minorities on Social Media (Delhi, 2016), accessed June 10, 2019, 
feminisminindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/FII_cyberbullying_report_website.pdf; Anita Gurumurthy and Amrita Vasudevan, “Hidden Figures: 
A Look at Technology-Mediated Violence against Women in India,” IT for Change, last modified 2019, accessed February 12, 2019, itforchange.net/
hidden-figures-a-look-at-technology-mediated-violence-against-women-india; Asad Ashraf, “A Dark Trade: Rape Videos for Sale in India,” Al-Jazeera, 
last modified October 2016, aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/10/dark-trade-rape-videos-sale-india-161023124250022.html
may seek to harm them through the appropriation 
and repurposing of content that they share unwarily 
about themselves, and the dangers of rape and shame 
culture. When assaulted physically and/or via sexualised 
images of them circulated amongst large numbers 
of users in short time spans, the women caught up in 
these events are overcome by feelings of shame and 
humiliation which are further fuelled by unsympathetic 
reactions from the wider community and the brazenness 
of perpetrators who feel that nothing will be done and 
that they have a right to women’s bodies. We were told 
repeatedly of these feelings, experiences and of the fear 
or despair that ensued. Exacerbating this situation, men 
(and sometimes other women) in some families do not 
support the women, rather blaming them for endangering 
themselves or for breaching their own privacy, for being 
“fast”, “casual”, “loose”, “unprincipled” or “slutty”. We were 
told that there is a widespread view that if a woman 
chooses to use a smartphone and any apps therein she 
is immoral to begin with or is on the way to becoming 
immoral through the practice of using technologies. Like 
the health activist whose tragic story is shared above, 
women who are already struggling under the burden and 
fear of public sexualisation and humiliation appear to see 
no alternative other than suicide50.
In India’s caste-driven society, since caste is 
operationalised and sustained through endogamous 
relationships within sub-castes (called jati) that place 
Two years back, in Chappra village, an obscene video was made 
of the [rape of an accredited social health activist] worker and 
was circulated – she committed suicide after that or she was 
murdered, I don’t know; but she died after that video became viral 
on WhatsApp.  
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51 Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste with a Reply to Mahatma Gandhi; and Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis, and Development 
(Jullundur City: Bheem Patrika Publications, 1968).
52 The Indian subcontinent has sustained a caste-based hierarchy in its society for more than two thousand years. The hierarchy is based on a broad 
four-tiered varna (type): brahmins (priest), kshatriya (warrior), vaishya (trade) and shudra (labour). The fifth and lowest type is outside varna, hence 
sometimes called as “avarna” or more commonly as “Dalit”. The actual operationalization and durability of the caste system stems from an exclusive 
endogamous system of association- called jati to form sub-castes that are closely tied to profession, surname, group identity and so on. There are 
thousands of jatis in India. See Gail Omvedt, Land, Caste and Politics in Indian States, 1. ed. (Delhi: Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, 
1982); Gail Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994); 
Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste with a Reply to Mahatma Gandhi; and Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis, and Development. 
the burden of purity on women, it is women who 
become key foci of community anxiety51. Modern 
technologies such as smartphones are perceived as 
a threat to the endogamous order that has been built 
through systematic and vicious restrictions on women’s 
mobility and via the caste-based, ghettoised spatial 
ordering of urban and rural neighbourhoods. Through 
WhatsApp and platforms such as TikTok, You Tube, 
Facebook and Instagram, the role of the woman as the 
carrier of caste purity comes under further strain. In 
this scenario, given that smartphones are not going to 
disappear, it is primarily girls and women who face the 
violent misogynist backlash from patriarchal and caste 
society’s angst about technological incursions. 
All-male WhatsApp groups have become fertile ground 
for the circulation of sexualised images of women 
and girls as well as for a wide range of pornographic 
material. Peer-to-peer encryption makes it possible for 
men to view and share material that they would struggle 
to share on more “public” platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram and You Tube. 
JJ: I also get porn every day, say I get about 2GB 
porn every day on WhatsApp. Even if you leave such 
groups, they will add you again and also call you 
and shout, why did you leave the group, that is how 
friends are. 
Focus group discussion with young and  
middle-aged men in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
KK: We get all kinds of messages. If it is a group 
with old friends, we sometimes even get vulgar 
messages (laughs) 
Focus group discussion with college  
students, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh
It should be noted that working class women from Dalit 
backgrounds and from so-called “backward castes52” 
experience both symbolic and physical violence more 
frequently than women from middle and upper castes. 
In our interactions with women across all four states, 
Figure 11: WhatsApp forwarded message of a young 
man and woman hanging from tree. There was no 
context provided whether this was a case of caste-
based murder, lynching, or suicide.
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a large number of Dalit and OBC women said that they 
received messages that brought sexual violence to the 
fore. These include:
•  Messages from unknown people, most likely men, saying 
“I like you” or “I love you”
•  Pornographic content 
•  Moving image footage of women being beaten up  
by men
•  Moving image footage of women being raped by men
•  Moving image footage of the murders of women
•  A woman being burnt alive
•  Couples getting beaten up.
While the material circulated is not caused by WhatsApp, 
the barrage of such material received by users is 
predicated on the intersection of available technologies 
with existing values, ideologies and practices – particularly 
casteism, misogyny and patriarchy. All of these values, 
ideologies and practices have been able to find a widened 
sphere for expression in India and elsewhere (particularly 
in the UK and the USA amongst diasporic groups) on 
cross-platform apps such as WhatsApp. 
YL: I’ve noticed how [on] these WhatsApp groups run 
by political parties I often see there are messages, 
images, and videos which are either morphed or very 
obviously mischievously edited to basically either 
make it look very sexual but in a derogatory way 
towards women. I remember that there was this 
[porno]graphic photo that was doing the rounds on 
these political WhatsApp groups and it was just after 
the air strikes that India conducted and the scene 
was rather graphic, it showed a woman who had the 
Pakistani colours on her being raped by a man who 
had Indian colours on him. It was being shared with 
53 The recent chilling publication of misogynist language and rape threats in a Facebook chat by a group of male university students in the UK about their 
female peers, and the subsequent legal and social furore confirms that this phenomenon is not confined to India. See Dulcie Lee and Larissa Kennelly, 
“Inside the Warwick University Rape Chat Scandal,” BBC, last modified 2019, accessed September 9, 2019, bbc.com/news/uk-48366835
much joy on these groups. The idea here was that 
India is the man and India is the one [that] conducted 
air strikes [and what] becomes a thing of masculinity 
and misogyny here is that Pakistan is [represented as] 
a woman and can’t do anything. That she is helpless. 
So, the semantics of that message are very common. 
I find in my observations that this kind of misogyny 
flows very freely, especially on political WhatsApp 
groups. The other thing that you see is because it’s 
a closed medium, a lot of the members who are not 
necessarily members who know each other, they 
are very open about expressing their defamatory, 
derogatory references toward women leaders. Be it 
any major political leader who is a woman, I would 
always find some derogatory references about her. 
Interview with journalist in Mumbai, Maharashtra
The quote above captures the intersectional nature of 
online misogyny. The muscular and patriarchal nature 
of nationalism promoted by the BJP and allied parties is 
closely tied to military aggression against Pakistan and 
to territorial security and expansion. Every time there 
is a cross-border conflict, the misogynistic aspect of 
nationalism is heightened. In this quote, Pakistan becomes 
feminised, enabling Hindutva supporting men to create 
a triple fantasy – a violent and easy domination of India 
over Pakistan, of Hindus over Muslims, and of men over 
women. The other notable issue pertaining to misogyny in 
WhatsApp groups and on other platforms such as TikTok 
and ShareChat is the form of expression enabled by a 
feeling of male conviviality. Sometimes WhatsApp groups 
with only male members feel emboldened to express 
misogynistic views that they perhaps feel they cannot air 
during interpersonal encounters with mixed gender groups 
or in the offline public sphere. The “closed off” nature of the 
group opens up a flow of existing misogyny53. 
Digital skills and functional media literacy allied to strong ideological 
prejudices and hatred against the other can assist the spread of 
disinformation, and sometimes be the trigger for misinformation.  
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The contexts of WhatsApp Usage in India
54 Rajat Kathuria et al., The Anatomy of an Internet Blackout: Measuring the Economic Impact of Internet Shutdowns in India, 2018, accessed 
September 19, 2019, icrier.org/pdf/Anatomy_of_an_Internet_Blackout.pdf
55 Sameer Hashmi, “‘Don’t Beat Us, Just Shoot Us’: Kashmiris Allege Violent Army Crackdown,” BBC, last modified 2019, accessed September 9, 2019, 
bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49481180; Vindu Goel, Karan Deep Singh, and Sameer Yasir, “India Shut Down Kashmir’s Internet Access. Now, ‘We 
Cannot Do Anything.,’” The New York Times, last modified 2019, accessed September 9, 2019, nytimes.com/2019/08/14/technology/india-kashmir-
internet.html
56 Data compiled by Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC) tracker internetshutdowns.in/. Last accessed 11th August, 2019. 
Drawing from broad socio-cultural perspectives on 
communication technologies, we argue that the tendency 
to spread misinformation and disinformation which has 
risen sharply in India and other countries does not stem 
directly from WhatsApp. Rather, the circulation of a high 
volume of dangerous and damaging misinformation and 
disinformation results from a combination of existing 
socio-political circumstances, popular attitudes and 
values, political power relations, and the availability of a 
technological tool that makes the circulation of content 
so easy and risk-free for the producers and forwarders of 
misinformation. A socio-cultural understanding provides 
a corrective to policy advocates and government officials 
who at times appear eager simply to clamp down on or 
censor technological platforms. There is undoubtedly a 
need to regulate platforms and apps stringently. However, 
in the cases we have been examining in India, there is 
no guarantee that such regulation, if left to state actors 
alone or even to a combination of private and state actors, 
would prevent the spread of disinformation and/ or the 
violence to which it leads. Such regulation, if undertaken 
in the same way that the electronic broadcast media has 
been regulated, would seem highly unlikely to solve the 
structural aspects of the crisis of violence that is engulfing 
various parts of the world, and India in particular. 
The rise of authoritarian right-wing populist regimes has 
been marked by increasing violence against social and 
ethnic minorities carried out with little fear of reprisal 
by ascendant and aggressive majority groups. In India, 
as elsewhere, simply regulating or tinkering with the 
affordances of various platforms is akin to putting a 
Band-Aid on a gaping wound. We have observed that 
the central government has resorted to shutting down 
the internet every time an instance of mass mobilisation  
is predicted. However, it has become clear that the shut 
downs of the internet in these circumstances are not 
necessarily in the public interest, and in fact tend to 
further a particular anti-dissent agenda. Textile traders in 
Surat (in the state of Gujarat) protesting against Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) legislation, caste-based protests 
demanding reservations and various other such protests 
that occur on a regular basis have been the target of 
state governments putting pressure on internet service 
providers to shut down the internet54. Such shut-downs 
have wide-ranging consequences. 
A case in point is the recent shutdown of the internet 
and all telecommunications services in Kashmir even 
before the abrogation of Kashmir’s autonomous status55. 
According to their announcements, the government uses 
internet shutdowns as a pre-emptive measure to mitigate 
street protests. However, the shutdown in Kashmir 
has caused panic given the impossibility of direct or 
mediated communication with family, friends and 
colleagues. In India rumours have been spreading about 
what is actually going on. On platforms such as Twitter, 
hashtags such as #KashmirwithModi were trending even 
while Kashmiris themselves did not have access to the 
internet. Overall, this tactic of shutting down all means 
of communication has become one of the main ways 
in which the government of India has denied people in 
Kashmir their universal right to freedom of speech and 
expression. In 2019 Jammu and Kashmir faced its 53rd 
internet shutdown; 47 per cent of all internet shutdowns 
in India have taken place in Jammu and Kashmir56. 
Shutting down the internet and mobile communications 
is, unsurprisingly, not an effective way to prevent 
disaffection or unrest amongst groups, or to prevent the 
spread of hateful content. 
It is difficult to control a video after it gets viral. 
Internet can be shut down only for some time 
but it is not a stable solution because as soon as 
the internet is restored, the videos are forwarded 
again. Sometimes people are warned not to send 
such communal videos but it not an effective 
measure. After a while such videos can be seen in 
circulation again.
Interview with police official in  
Muzaffarnagar,Uttar Pradesh 
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The Ideology of Hindutva
57 Sumit Sarkar, “The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar,” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 5 (1993): 163–167; G Aloysius, “Trajectory of Hindutva,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 24 (1994): 1450–1452.
58 Jairus Banaji, Fascism: Essays on Europe and India (Gurgaon, Haryana: Three Essays Collective, 2016); Christophe Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism: A 
Reader (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2007).
In 2019, in India, the broad socio-cultural context that 
drives disinformation is that of Hindutva, an ideology 
stemming from the mass-based organisation the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) founded in 1925 
and its various allied wings. Drawing inspiration from 
fascist movements in Italy and Germany in the early 
years of the 20th century57, the ideologues of the RSS 
carved out a vision of a nation state founded on ethno-
religious affiliation rather than secular or democratic 
principles. This ideology which has come to be called 
Hindutva, has since the 1950s been operationalised in 
the formal political system through the Jan Sangh that 
since 1980 renamed itself as the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP). Along with a host of other organisations, this 
ideology materialises through the Sangh Parivar (the 
family of organisations affiliated to Hindutva)58. 
The Hindutva project of reconfiguring India as a Hindu-
dominated nation, while always powerful, has steadily 
gained purchase within branches of the state as well 
as holding a hegemonic position vis-a-vis symbolic 
aspects of everyday social life in India. Historically, 
much of the growth of Hindutva can be attributed to 
the interests not of all Hindus or all Indians but of the 
powerful dominant castes and their allies, especially the 
Brahmins and business-castes whose wealth and power 
were threatened by the full implications of secular 
and socialist thoughts for dismantling caste-based 
society and providing a social security net for the poor. 
However, all the dominant castes put together do not 
represent more than a quarter of the 1.37 billion strong 
population. Therefore, dominant caste interests have to 
be maintained through the consent of the majority, or 
the Bahujan communities comprising Other Backward 
Castes (OBCs), Dalits and Adivasis. 
Precisely in order to provide the cohesive glue for a 
conflict driven caste system and in order to maintain 
the dominance of a small minority over a vast majority, 
the ideology of Hindutva presents itself as a solution for 
winning consent. However, in order to maintain internal 
cohesion, the boundary line needs to be drawn and the 
figure of the outsider needs to be posited. Hindutva 
ideologues present Muslims as the enemy of the nation. 
Over time, Muslims in India have found themselves 
consistently accused of being traitors, allies of foreign 
states and interlopers who belong in the nation state of 
Pakistan with whom the Indian state has fought several 
wars and continues to engage in low-key conflict on 
a more or less continuous basis. In the face of global 
capitalism and its various consequences, the project 
of Hindutva too has accelerated the broad tendencies 
which became visible in the 1920s. 
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Since the late 1980s, the parliamentary strength of 
the BJP has increased steadily. Dominant castes have 
come together and have now cornered most of the 
Parliamentary seats59. The modest increase in OBC 
representation in the lower house of the Indian Parliament 
has been reversed in the 2019 elections, while in political 
and entertainment discourse all Indian Muslims are even 
more ubiquitously represented by BJP and allied politicians 
as the enemies of Hindus and Hinduism. 
WhatsApp as a technological cross-platform app 
appears in India in this abovementioned specific 
conjuncture. Although he seems to underplay the 
problem by making it appear to be something that might 
equally affect all communities depending on which 
locality one is in, a journalist in Mumbai demonstrates 
some alertness to the way in which this dominant 
narrative about Muslims is easily exacerbated through 
visual misinformation:
V: ...Videos are being sent with purpose these days. 
For example, in the video where a boy was tied to a 
tree and there were men beating him, one can just 
edit the video and add a skull cap to a man who is 
beating the boy. That’s it, now it has become Hindu 
vs Muslim. But in reality, he may be Hindu [doing the 
beating] but it is made to look like he is Muslim and 
this creates misunderstandings. Once these videos 
get forwarded and people watch these videos, it 
gets ingrained in our minds and we start picking 
fights with people of other religions. [Whichever 
religion] is in majority [of the local population] in 
whichever area, will start reacting. [After that] even 
59 Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers, “Explained: In Hindi Heartland, Upper Castes Dominate New Lok Sabha,” The Indian Express (Delhi, May 27, 
2019), accessed July 21, 2019, indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-hindi-heartland-upper-castes-dominate-new-house-5747511/
[if] a goat [belonging to] a Muslim enters my field, 
and I have already watched this video and am 
thinking that a Muslim man was beating a Hindu 
boy, I will get angry and make an issue of [my 
neighbour’s] goat entering my field. This is how 
[WhatsApp based incitement to violence] works. 
Interview with journalist in Mumbai, Maharashtra
Z: After the 2013 incident there is an increased 
understanding among people, but there is a fear of 
it being repeated again. Things are still sensitive. In 
future the same can happen again. During riots the 
video which went viral was not of our country. This 
was revealed later. People can be provoked through 
fake news even today. Riots can be provoked using 
that kind of video. 
Interview with police official,  
Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh
WW: I received a message recently about a 
boy from Hubli who was a gau-rakshak [cow-
protector] who committed suicide. People are 
using this situation to spread communalism. 
They are conspiring that it is a murder and using 
it to instigate people. Even a prominent BJP 
leader tweeted saying it is a murder. Many people 
forwarded this tweet even though she deleted that 
tweet later [as it was an unsubstantiated rumour]. 
Interview with electronics engineer  
in Dharwad, Karnataka
I received a message recently about a boy from Hubli who was a gau-
rakshak [cow-protector] who committed suicide. People are using this 
situation to spread communalism. They are conspiring that it is a murder 
and using it to instigate people. Even a prominent BJP leader tweeted 
saying it is a murder. Many people forwarded this tweet even though she 
deleted that tweet later [as it was an unsubstantiated rumour].  
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TT: I belong to Gujarat, and there we had horrific 
incidents happening because of fake news. For 
example, 2-3 years back, a news spread that during 
Navratri [festival] one Muslim man is standing with 
his feet on one of the goddesses, or something 
stupid like that. In Gujarat people have a tendency 
for people to get influenced by riot-like things, 
everybody wants to contribute to it. It is very normal 
there; they will [set] light [to] an empty bus, burn 
public property. So that video also created a tense 
environment during Navratri between Hindu-Muslim 
in the area. They had put an empty bus on fire. 
WhatsApp was also shut off for 3-4 days, I think 
the internet was working but only WhatsApp was 
banned on those days. Ten years back you would 
never think that a small message could lead to 
things like this. 
TT: I think there is more fear in using WhatsApp 
today. Just today I was discussing with my friend 
about this new app which has encrypted chats, 
we should start using it instead of WhatsApp. I am 
always sceptical to talk about things that are not 
easy to talk about these days on WhatsApp. We 
were talking about, how I was buying buff for my 
dog, I was talking to a friend on WhatsApp how I 
am going to go and buy buff [buffalo meat] for my 
dog and as soon as I sent it, I was like shit, I should 
delete it, what if someone is actually reading this 
chat and I end up being lynched or something. So, 
one gets scared. Even if we are laughing about it 
now but there is a certain fear around. 
Interview with NGO worker in  
Dewas, Madhya Pradesh
As the last quote reveals, there is a tangible sense of 
fear, especially among the younger active but secular 
users of WhatsApp who feel that they will face violent 
consequences from political vigilante groups given the 
political and cultural contexts in which they live. Other 
users shared examples when they faced ostracization 
and humiliation when they chose to question a 
dominant government or Hindutva narrative, even 
amongst friends.
Figure 12: WhatsApp forwarded 
message of popular yoga practitioner, 
businessman and champion of 
Hindutva, Baba Ramdev with calf.
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TT: I got a message related to religion about whether 
temple or mosque should be built in Ayodhya60. I wrote 
back on the group saying that no temple or mosque 
should be built there, but we should build a school 
there for education. As a consequence, I was made to 
exit the group. Even I didn’t ask why did they remove 
me from the group. They were all my old long-time 
friends. I speak to them otherwise on phone. I never 
asked them about what happened on that WhatsApp 
group because all of us know what happened, so what 
is there to ask? 
Interview with NGO worker,  
Dewas, Madhya Pradesh 
[Emphasis added]
60 In 1992, supporters of Hindutva illegally demolished the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, a city in Uttar Pradesh, long believed by Hindutva supporters to 
be the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram.
Technology is not outside of or immune to the political and 
social circumstances of the locations in which it is used. In 
India and more widely the various WhatsApp groups which 
incorporate users, are not groups created in a vacuum. 
These groups borrow from existing forms of sociality in 
their places of origin. Thus, caste-based networks that 
go back centuries have now had superimposed upon 
them networks of spatiality (Brahmin-only apartments, or 
Dalits forced to settle outside a village) and professionality 
(upper level administrators in public and private sectors 
dominated by dominant castes) and more recently, online 
sociality. Incitement works by creating the conditions of 
hatred, contempt and disgust that spark into violence. 
EE: ...a few Hindu villagers actually found some animal 
remains in a plastic bag. It was some body parts, 
but it was unclear which animal it was. But someone 
posted a message saying that a cow has been 
slaughtered in this particular area and this person has 
done this because he had his son’s wedding last night 
(and the animal remains were found very close to his 
house). That message was started on WhatsApp and 
someone clicked a photo of that and wrote a note 
below that and spread it. Within minutes there were 
mobs and mobs of people, over a few thousands 
according to what the cops told me, who descended 
on that village and were standing outside the said 
man’s house. They were a Muslim family and his son 
had just gotten married so he had had a feast at  
his house. The [mobs] descended there and  
assaulted him only because most of them saw  
that WhatsApp message. 
Interview with journalist in Mumbai, Maharashtra
The assault described here took place at that moment 
only because most of the members of that vigilante 
mob saw that particular piece of misinformation on 
WhatsApp. However, in our view, such daily practices of 
creating and sharing information and misinformation 
are inextricably linked to existing ideological suspicions 
and hatreds as this quote above shows. The technical 
affordances (smartphone including camera, the facility 
of group-based messaging and text caption for images 
in WhatsApp, telecommunication network/spectrum) are 
operationalised and immediately become a mob of a “few 
thousands” since in such cases, there are some Hindus 
who are already waiting to attack the Muslim family. 
Figure 13: WhatsApp forwarded message of popular 
spiritual leader and champion of Hindutva, Jaggi Vasudev 
comparing casualties of terror attacks between BJP and 
Congress governments.
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User Motivations 
While we certainly encountered much reflexive thinking 
on other issues – especially linked to gender, in focus 
groups with women – a key feature of much of the talk 
we encountered around motivations for passing on 
messages in WhatsApp groups was a notable lack of 
reflexivity involved in receiving, decoding and forwarding 
information and misinformation. Some groups of users 
tend to forward messages they receive just based on 
the subject line, without even opening the messages to 
check what the information is about. They claim that the 
preview is sufficient to give them a sense of the value 
of the message and its importance. The contextual 
understanding in terms of dynamics of group, or the 
obvious affiliation of a group with a particular agenda, 
suffices to give the user a sense of whether a message 
is worth sharing or not. 
O: [male] I don’t check forwarded content always, 
not only that sometimes I forward posts without 
reading in detail. Maybe it’s wrong but I forward 
posts without checking that is also truth.
K: [female] We don’t know how many times we have 
forwarded content without checking that it is truth 
or not. 
Focus group discussion with men and  
women in Satara, Maharashtra
Q: I read two lines of post then we get sense of that 
post then I take decision about forwarding or not. 
When new person is using WhatsApp, his curiosity 
is different than regular user so new person will 
check every message. Old user can understand by 
reading 2 lines. 
Focus group discussion with male  
students in Pune, Maharashtra
P: I usually get “good morning”, “good night” 
messages or “forward this message to five people 
otherwise something bad will happen to you”. I 
get religious messages like photos of goddesses. 
During the election I got messages from different 
political parties. I also get Hindu-Muslim conflict 
videos but don’t usually watch these. What happens 
normally is that you start watching a video and after 
a few seconds you stop and just forward it your 
friends. One does not [need to] watch the complete 
video to understand what is being said in the video. 
Only later you realise what you have sent to whom. 
Interview with young male college graduate,  
Dewas, Madhya Pradesh
R: We also add only those people who we know. 
But without checking people can forward any post 
or video so I think we should double check before 
forwarding. Maybe sometime I also forget this thing.
S: If a person is writing his own thoughts, or sharing 
any news and I know he is a good person maybe 
then I can forward that post.
T: I don’t check content always [before forwarding]. 
[I know that] we cannot believe just anyone’s 
forwarded messages but still I don’t check  
[before forwarding]. 
Focus group discussion with middle-aged men  
and women, Chandrapur, Maharashtra
None of the users in our focus groups admitted 
to spreading disinformation and misinformation 
deliberately. Most, however, revealed entrenched 
practices of sharing misinformation and disinformation, 
sometimes based on their trust in the sender or originator 
of the message, whilst also claiming that disinformation 
is always spread by “others”. They attributed this spread 
During the election I got messages from different political parties. I also get 
Hindu-Muslim conflict videos but don’t usually watch these. What happens 
normally is that you start watching a video and after a few seconds you 
stop and just forward it your friends. One does not [need to] watch the 
complete video to understand what is being said in the video. Only later you 
realise what you have sent to whom.  
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to people either being duped into believing pieces of 
misinformation or to those others’ lack of moral turpitude 
as an individual or group member, or to supposed rural 
backwardness and illiteracy: 
U: There was a video of Rahul Gandhi talking 
about making potatoes into gold. I’m sure he didn’t 
actually say that. You can watch news on TV also to 
distinguish what’s fake and what’s not. I don’t send 
these videos. I just delete them. Mostly people in 
villages send fake messages because they don’t 
know how to read and write. Educated people also 
send [fake] messages actually but its less. If people 
become more aware [and literate] this will stop. 
Interview with male student, Ujjain,  
Madhya Pradesh [Emphasis added]
A few minutes later in the same interview when asked 
about his usage during the Pulwama attacks, this student 
said “I mostly received very patriotic messages. But that 
was a very charged time. Even the fake news seemed 
true to me . I received four videos about the attack. It later 
turned out that only one was real and the rest were fake” 
[Emphasis added]. Thinking the patriotic videos were real, 
this urban, educated student had already shared them by 
the time he discovered his mistake. 
Particularly amongst well-educated users who are 
aware of the need for a politically correct stance 
on disinformation, we found a tendency to position 
themselves as alert, ethical, responsible and savvy 
media users. However, as the above example shows, 
even very educated and media literate users are 
often not aware of the contradictions in their beliefs 
and behaviours. Following their views further, they 
appear to think that some types of disinformation and 
misinformation are exempt from blame if they are 
shared in the heat of the moment, at a “charged time” 
when nationalist passions are running high. On the 
surface, this may seem almost as a “non-motivation”. 
We argue that on the contrary, in the cases we have 
observed it is the deep-seated ideology of Indian 
nationalism, national security, and hostility or hatred 
towards Kashmiris, Muslims, and others that appears 
to be the subtle moral motivation to overlook one’s own 
practice of sharing disinformation during supposedly 
politically tense times. 
As noted before, a key aspect of belonging to a 
WhatsApp group is the sociality involved in creating and 
being in a group. 
W: I have a WhatsApp group, it has 255 members, 
now cannot add any more people, I have reached 
the maximum limit on the group. It is called [person 
name] mitra mandli [friend group]. I am the only 
admin on the group. I have done the setting the 
group that no one can change the icon or name 
of the group, only I can. I had made other people 
admin before but they started adding random 
people to the group, I didn’t even know those 
people. I have been running this group for three 
years now. I just made it, for no specific reason. 
We were only 20-30 people initially in the group. 
It gradually grew big. All people here [referring to 
focus group participants] are also part of this group. 
I had opened the group for time-pass. At that time, 
I didn’t even know much about a WhatsApp group, 
what is it, what does it do, I just created one. We 
also chat on that group. 
Focus group discussion with male  
students, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh
All participants in the quote above came from a Dalit 
community and were part of several other WhatsApp 
groups that asserted their rights as Dalits, groups 
named after Dr Ambedkar and Jyotirao Phule (both well-
known anti-caste campaigners and public intellectuals). 
In such cases, WhatsApp has enabled a mode of 
sociality where young users who have access to 
smartphones, media literacy, and access to affordable 
data can create networks for young Dalits whose 
interests are represented neither in mainstream media, 
nor in the offline public sphere and discourse due to 
caste bias. We have heard it suggested in discussion, 
that end-to-end encryption of WhatsApp messages 
enables those suffering various forms of oppression 
and who might not otherwise have a voice in the 
mainstream media to circulate information germane 
to their cause, and to communicate safely with each 
other. This view, which suggests the important role of 
encrypted communications apps such as WhatsApp 
for enabling resistance and strengthening aspects of 
democracy in India, is one that must to be considered 
seriously alongside the other findings of our research.
Most users we interviewed are members of multiple 
groups – often with contradictory claims and 
affiliations, ranging from health-related groups to groups 
of political parties (see quotes from users in the section 
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on Affordances, Platforms and Infrastructures on pages 
21-23). Many users claimed a level of exhaustion with 
the constant flow of information, a relentless stream of 
messages that would be impossible to go through with 
attentive thoroughness in a single day.
FF: I’m not on any third-party groups; friends’ group 
and company group and family group. I was on a 
political group but I exited because I was getting 
tired of the repeated messages and my phone 
memory was also becoming full. So, I left it. 
GG: Mainly religious and political. Too many 
messages and too many lies. It’s just Chatting, 
chatting, chatting. There is no use. Just because 
of the provision of groups, there are 200/300/400 
messages coming daily and I don’t think that’s right.
Interviews with mobile phone shop  
employee and a chartered accountant  
25-30 years, males, Dharwad, Karnataka
It is important not to dismiss this aspect of WhatsApp 
group membership. The cognitive, physical and 
emotional labour that would be required to process, 
and decide whether to respond, amend, delete, forward-
to-many or forward-to-some the bulk of messages 
received on any given day is significant – and in some 
cases would (and does) comprise a full-time, paid job.  
In the face of such relentless flows of sayings, greetings, 
prayers, comments, information, misinformation and 
disinformation, ordinary users who are not paid to 
administer social media spaces demonstrate two key 
tendencies associated with the need for speed – bulk 
deletion and/or bulk forwarding of messages. Both 
actions are based on specific motivations.
Some users bulk delete messages at a specified time 
of day, usually the end of each day; it could also be 
the bulk deletion of messages only for specific groups 
where unread messages have accumulated. This is a 
tactic for negotiating challenges at both the practical 
and the affective levels. Bulk deletion of messages 
enables users to feel that they are successfully avoiding 
drowning in an overload of messages on their phones 
and thus ease the sense of pressure that we were 
repeatedly told accompanies belonging to a lot of very 
active WhatsApp groups, while retaining the feeling of 
connectedness and/or community that being in those 
groups brings. There are also practical challenges 
associated with a build-up of unread messages. If too 
many messages accumulate, the storage capacity of 
a user’s phone risks filling up, or going through many 
messages might drain the batteries of the phone. 
In other cases, the signal of the network is hard to 
find so users are selective about what content they 
engage with. Almost every person who has been using 
WhatsApp spoke unfailingly, and disparagingly, about 
having to delete multiple messages wishing them good 
morning, good night, hello etc with accompanying 
images/GIFs/videos on a daily basis. 
Our findings reveal two further motivations. One is a 
fear of missing out and of being excluded thereafter. 
Users believe that the forwarding of a message is a 
valid form of participation in a group, and counts as 
a group activity or participation in the eyes of other 
group members. We heard the fear expressed on 
several occasions that if a WhatsApp group member 
stops participating overtly, then the group dynamics 
will slowly start excluding them and will cohere around 
only those members who drive the activity of that group 
by regular postings, stories, forwards and message 
responses. The other motivation for forwarding is 
the establishment of a user’s own credibility and 
importance with regard to the subject matter of the 
None of the users in our focus groups admitted to spreading disinformation 
and misinformation deliberately. Most, however, revealed entrenched 
practices of sharing misinformation and disinformation.  
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group. Sometimes local events such as accidents or 
riots, or other breaches of the peace do not make it 
onto the television news (especially given that television 
programming is largely urban-centric). Both of these 
motivations were discussed primarily by men. Several 
male users also mentioned this lack of attention from 
mainstream broadcast media towards local issues 
and events as an opportunity to establish their own 
importance and credibility as people who are the first to 
be in the know about important local events. 
We interpreted their comments as being an expression 
of the wish to be perceived by their communities as 
nodes of information. Possessing information that 
others do not yet possess was often discussed in our 
focus groups as an important form of symbolic capital. 
In order to rush to ensure their rank as the first passer 
of information, many users hasten to put together a 
pastiche of hurriedly assembled content to pass on as 
fast as they can. If there is news of an accident and 
still or moving images are unavailable, then images 
from previous such incidents are used unhesitatingly 
along with captions or voiceovers that connect the 
information to an event believed to have taken place 
in their region. Such swift action requires a certain 
degree of skill and functional media literacy to achieve 
which also carries kudos. Moreover, such an action 
is not perceived by most users as a contribution to 
misinformation or disinformation, but rather is perceived 
as analogous to the way in which mainstream media 
frequently deploy “stock images” from news agencies 
such as Reuters and AFP while reporting a developing 
story. Positioning themselves as amateur reporters in 
the context of their own communities, the users who 
want to “post first” or “forward first” are less concerned 
with reliability or the potential to start dangerous 
rumours than with immediacy and impact. Our analysis 
was also confirmed by other users who commented 
on those in their groups who always “post first” or from 
whom many forwards emanate, suggesting that the 
proportion of inaccurate or false information might 
be larger from these people but that they still had a 
reputation as very knowledgeable and informed. 
Our analysis of the data suggests that for many 
amateur “WhatsApp reporters”, the internet appears 
to be a vast repository of stock messages. Given the 
limited time in which to gain first mover advantage, they 
take what they can get. 
All of this connects to the strong affective element 
at play in the use of WhatsApp for the circulation of 
content that is apparently informational. Amidst the flow 
of hundreds of messages, the ones which stand out are 
those that convey a sense of immediacy, and those that 
can shock. 
Figure 14: WhatsApp forwarded message of forest fires in 
California shared as an image of forest fires in Karnataka.
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Overwhelming Information,  
Spectacular Violence
Many images that users forwarded to us pertained to 
the overwhelming. These were video clips of massive 
waterfalls, or natural disasters (hurricanes, tornados), 
accidents, mishaps, and of course connected to violence. 
Many users spoke about messages that disturbed them, 
as if these messages made it impossible to re-enter 
the real world by separating and distancing what they 
had seen on the screen of their phone screens. In the 
case of the violence connected to rumours about child 
kidnapping and kidney theft by strangers, the affective 
element in WhatsApp usage is noteworthy. These 
messages frequently display an image (for instance, one 
repeatedly shared that we believe to have been borrowed 
from a conflict situation in the Middle East) of what 
appears to be children’s corpses – each of their bodies 
partially covered by a sheet. The effect on some viewers 
is immediate and visceral.
This visual message is accompanied by voiceover saying 
that these children lie dead because their organs were 
harvested by unknown persons and that all should be 
vigilant in catching and preventing or punishing the culprits 
and protecting their own children. The many small and 
apparently dead bodies in the image convey that what 
is at stake is a serious problem, not a stray incident. The 
partial sheet covering the bodies connotes a concealment 
of the horrors of illegal kidney and organ harvesting; at the 
very same time, they excite the imagination with regard 
to the damage which the illegal organ harvesting has 
done to the tiny bodies beneath the sheets. The voiceover 
usually narrates the same script with minor variations. And 
where there is written text, it is usually the same content 
translated into various regional languages. Text (in both 
voiceover and description) anchors the image announcing 
a tangible, clear and present danger. In each case, the 
(fake) crime is explained, it is alleged that the image is from 
some other Indian state, and that the perpetrator is a single 
individual or a group of criminals from a particular state and 
that they have been observed recently in nearby regions. 
The message goes on to say that it is crucial to share the 
message widely in order to “keep our children safe” and 
“apprehend the perpetrators”. 
In such messages, the obvious meaning is a request 
to users to assume civic duty for the sake of the most 
vulnerable – defenceless children. The sense of civic duty 
is amplified due to its informal nature. The image acts 
as “proof” that the forces of law and order have failed to 
prevent such an atrocity, therefore the implied burden 
to save the children now rests solely on the public, who 
become the vigilant guardians in each society – the 
recipients of the message and other WhatsApp users. 
At another level, the message can stir a deep anxiety and 
anger in the recipients, who are themselves often from poor 
and marginal communities. It calls into being a feeling of 
great injustice, that it is not enough that they have to work 
all day to barely survive, and even after this struggle, and 
in spite of this struggle, there is a threat to their children. 
The feelings of horror evoked by the image appear to impel 
some users to forward these messages. At this moment, 
the movement of discourse is temporarily frozen and affect 
drives the circulation of misinformation. 
In as many as 11 states across India, nearly 50 entirely 
innocent Indian citizens going about their daily business 
have been caught and beaten to death, suspected to be 
kidney snatchers. In contrast to the lynchings around 
rumours of beef eating or cow slaughter which clearly 
target Dalits and Muslims, the kidney-snatching WhatsApp 
rumours have, till the middle of 2019 at least, not appeared 
to target a particular religion or caste grouping but rather to 
focus on the idea of the “stranger” who is not to be trusted. 
Victims of these lynch mobs hail from all communities, are 
male and female, and come from several social classes. In 
several cases, perpetrators continued beating the victims 
even after the police had arrived on the scene. Triggered 
by the rumours circulating on WhatsApp and by word of 
mouth thereafter, extreme violence has been unleashed. 
In the case of the instigation of sectarian violence, 
messages were either used to humiliate and point 
suspicion at Muslims directly or to intensify pride 
about Hindutva without mentioning Muslims but with a 
connotation that was derogatory towards Muslims. 
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For example, in July 2019, a 400-year old idol of the Hindu 
god Shiva in Maharashtra was partially damaged by 
lightning. Some users started a rumour that the idol had 
been vandalised by Muslim groups61. In another rumour, 
a Brazilian prison riot video had been shared as a warning 
that thousands of Rohingya Muslims are on the prowl 
looking to kidnap children62. 
In turn the affective power of this content translates into a 
range of emotions that form the immediate backdrop for 
spread of disinformation and subsequent violence. These 
emotions are anger, pride, disgust, humiliation, suspicion 
and hatred. Incidents alleged to have happened at a 
local, regional or national level are deliberately twisted to 
deepen anti-Muslim prejudice and hatred, to provoke pride 
in an imagined Hindu community and to legitimise any 
subsequent violence against Muslims. 
FT: ...mostly just photos and videos praising the 
[Hindu] community. Also, some information about 
things happening in the area like if an accident 
happens, someone will send a photo of that along with 
the location. Once I got a video of a man [apparently] 
killing a cow along with a message full of abuses for 
him. It also said that only true Hindus would share this.
I: So, did you forward this?
FT: ...sometimes you have to share it because what 
they [the Muslims] are doing is wrong 
Focus group discussion with young  
men in Nagda, Madhya Pradesh
61 Pooja Chaudhuri, “Shiva Idol in Maharashtra Vandalised by Muslims? Initial Probe Says Damage by Lightning Strike,” Alt News, last modified 2019, accessed 
September 9, 2019, altnews.in/shiva-idol-in-maharashtra-vandalised-by-muslims-initial-probe-says-damage-by-lightning-strike/
62 Pooja Chaudhuri, “Video of 2017 Brazil Prison Riot Shared as Rohingya Muslim Kidnapping Gangs on Prowl,” Alt News, last modified 2019, 
accessed September 9, 2019, altnews.in/video-of-2017-brazil-prison-riot-shared-as-rohingya-muslim-kidnapping-gangs-on-prowl/
While those belonging to dominant castes have make 
increasingly public assertions about what is right and 
wrong with regard to their version of religion (which takes 
precedence over whether information is accurate or 
not), this conflict has deeply adverse implications for the 
everyday lives and security of Muslims across India
...my friend’s father used to run a group called 
[redacted] group. A rally was being taken out in Ujjain, 
and there was permission for only 200 people to 
attend it. But when the rally happened, the crowd 
started to gather and it became really big. Hindus 
objected to it and complained to the police. My 
friend’s father was not there in the rally but they all 
had discussed about the rally on the WhatsApp group. 
Police did some investigation and arrested my friend’s 
father because he was the admin of that group. They 
said that he instigated Muslims to take out a rally. He 
was in jail for three months. 
Focus group discussion with Muslim  
men in Tarana, Madhya Pradesh
During the air strikes (see Timeline of the Pulawama and 
Balakot Attacks on page 48) in Balakot (on the border 
of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), an Indian Air Force pilot 
was captured and was in Pakistani custody, an event that 
was widely reported by mainstream television and press 
news across India. He was kept as a prisoner of war for 
about a week before the Pakistani government made the 
decision to send him back to India as a gesture of goodwill 
and as a concrete measure to de-escalate the impending 
conflict. Within a week, hundreds of thousands of images 
of the captured pilot, some gleaned from social media and 
…mostly just photos and videos praising the [Hindu] community. Also, 
some information about things happening in the area like if an accident 
happens, someone will send a photo of that along with the location. Once I 
got a video of a man [apparently] killing a cow along with a message full of 
abuses for him. It also said that only true Hindus would share this.  
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others from mainstream news media, were circulating on 
WhatsApp and across many other platforms including 
Facebook and ShareChat. Most of the images were not 
accompanied by any commentary, voiceover or text. These 
were images of the pilot with some bleeding on the face, 
or video clips of some unknown people capturing the pilot 
before a Pakistani army man appears to enter the frame 
and come to usher the pilot to safety from a mob (or, by 
implication, to further torture). Other versions included 
doctored content and manipulation of the same content, 
so the image of the pilot was, variously, surrounded by 
the Indian flag, or inserted into a patriotic song with a 
slideshow of the images of the pilot, or inserted into posters 
connoting that the pilot is a popular film star, or images 
of the pilot with his family or his peers from the army. All 
of these images served to concentrate several disparate 
ideological threads into a single narrative. 
Figure 16: A reverse image search reveals hundreds of originators of the photograph on ShareChat and other applications, 
in different languages.
…sometimes you have to share it because what they [the Muslims] 
are doing is wrong.  
Figure 15: Screenshot of WhatsApp forwarded message 
about kidney snatching.
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Timeline of the Pulwama and Balakot attacks
On the 14th of February 2019, forty Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed when two 
buses (as part of a larger convoy) became the target 
of a suicide bombing in Pulwama, a district in South 
Kashmir. After the suicide bombing, Adil Ahmad Dar, 
a young Kashmiri from Pulwama released a video 
claiming responsibility for the attack and associating 
himself with Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). Dar had, 
apparently, been radicalised after being attacked by 
pellet guns fired by Indian army personnel in 2016 to 
quell the subsequent outpouring of public sympathy 
following the killing of popular militant Burhan Wani. 
Over the next twelve days mainstream media (especially 
television channels) as well as social media witnessed 
heated debates about nationalism and national security. 
Although there was no evidence that the Pulwama 
suicide bomber had anything to do with Pakistan, 
much of the Indian domestic media coverage was 
aggressively in favour of military aggression against 
Pakistan. Further, thousands of Kashmiris were targeted 
across the country in instances of discrimination, 
individual and mob violence. On the 26th of February, 
12 jet planes of the Indian Air Force dropped five 
1000 kilogram bombs in Balakot, Pakistan. The Indian 
government maintained that this air strike caused major 
damage to a JeM camp in Balakot and that terrorists 
of JeM had been killed (although the exact number of 
casualties varied in different reports). Foreign press 
such as Al-Jazeera, the BBC, Reuters have suggested 
that analysis of satellite imagery suggests no casualties 
or major damage to JeM camp in Balakot. On the 27th of 
February, Pakistani jet planes entered Indian air space, 
allegedly with the intention of targeting Indian military 
establishments. In the ensuing aerial confrontation, 
one Indian and one Pakistani plane were shot down. 
Pakistan captured Air Force pilot Wing Commander 
Abhinandan Varthaman and detained him as a 
prisoner of war. On the 1st of March, Pakistan released 
Varthaman as a gesture of peace. Subsequently 
tensions eased between the two countries, although 
the online rhetoric remained high. Prominent BJP 
politicians including Prime Minister Modi and president 
of the BJP, Amit Shah referred to the Pulwama and the 
Balakot attacks repeatedly during the last stages of their 
election campaign. As a result, this episode was heavily 
discussed by mainstream media journalists and social 
media users till the conclusion of the general election in 
India on the 19th of May. 
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First, the captured pilot (who crashed while on a mission 
and landed over the border inside Pakistan) was 
circulated as proof that India was under attack from an 
enemy country and at war. The implications of those 
images were that at times such as these, all “petty party 
politics” should be cast aside and that every true Indian 
needs to come together in the national interest to join 
against Pakistan and against anyone who supports 
Pakistani terrorists. The captured and released pilot 
became the symbol of national pride – a young man 
who had not revealed a word about Indian secrets 
in spite of being captured by the enemy. All need to 
come together to pray for his speedy and safe return. 
On another level, the pilot and the video of unknown 
(presumably Muslim) Pakistanis capturing the pilot 
became a confirmation of the Muslim as an enemy. 
Moreover, the reportage on this episode by mainstream 
media along with the political context in which it has 
been framed – namely one of wounded masculine 
national pride, led to violent consequences for anyone 
who dared to question the Indian nationalist narrative 
and the version of events purveyed by the government. 
X: So, someone once sent this one post about 
Pulwama that said that we should all come 
together and celebrate our martyrs. So, I wrote 
“LOL”. People started getting very furious. They 
asked how I could make fun of deaths. I said that 
I wasn’t making fun of death but I would certainly 
make fun of this celebration of martyrdom. This 
started a whole discussion. I also talked about 
how army is masculinist and assists in state 
sponsored crimes. These are words that we use in 
academia very frequently. Someone else said that 
a WhatsApp group wasn’t an appropriate place for 
this discussion and after that it kind of fizzled out. 
But then sometime later I realised that screenshots 
from that conversation were circulating all around 
the campus. And then those were posted on Twitter 
by a student from this college who also very proudly 
claims to be an office bearer of the ABVP [student 
wing of the BJP]. He later pulled down those posts. 
He blurred everyone’s numbers but mine. This post 
was getting shared by a BJP MLA and another 
BJP spokesperson. It was flooding all over Twitter. 
And then someone sent me a message saying this 
was happening. Then I started getting calls that I 
didn’t answer. Later I started getting [threatening] 
messages on Facebook so I deactivated Facebook. 
But before that someone had got a photo of me 
and my mother and circulated that on Twitter. My 
number and my email ID, my Facebook, Twitter 
account was made public. 
Interview with female student, Mumbai, Maharashtra
Someone else said that a WhatsApp group wasn’t an appropriate 
place for this discussion and after that it kind of fizzled out. 
But then sometime later I realised that screenshots from that 
conversation were circulating all around the campus. And then 
those were posted on Twitter by a student from this college 
who also very proudly claims to be an office bearer of the ABVP 
[student wing of the BJP]. He later pulled down those posts. 
He blurred everyone’s numbers but mine. This post was getting 
shared by a BJP MLA and another BJP spokesperson. It was 
flooding all over Twitter.  
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This episode of doxing that we were told about was only 
one amongst dozens reported by other ordinary citizens 
and public figures who commented in a similar vein or 
sounded a note of caution about the circumstances 
of ordinary Kashmiris, or about the dangers of Indian 
nationalist rhetoric63. 
In 2013 Muzaffarnagar district in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh witnessed severe riots targeting Muslims. 
Politically motivated riots in 2013 have not dimmed 
the prospects of ongoing and future violence based on 
religious discrimination. 
VV: At the time when Pulwama attack happened, 
it was seen as a Hindu-Muslim issue. In many 
WhatsApp groups, people of both the religions 
were verbally abusing each other. So, in one 
group, the argument became big, [redacted]one 
shopkeeper had posted something on the group 
and people went and ransacked his shop. Scenes is 
created at Police stations, just last week, someone 
had posted something against the Gita [Hindu 
religious text], they went to the [redacted] police 
station and created a scene. In another case, 
the local education officer had made a personal 
group of the department. During Pulwama attack 
everybody was sharing their personal views on 
the group. So, someone commented saying that 
this attack has not happened on its own but it has 
63 Press Trust of India, “Kolkata Girl Gets Rape Threats for Facebook Post on Kashmir,” India Today, last modified 2019, accessed September 9, 2019, 
indiatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-news-kolkata-girl-gets-rape-threats-for-facebook-post-on-kashmir-1460631-2019-02-20
64 See indiatoday.in/india/story/love-jihad-row-yogi-adityanath-provocative-speech-205846-2014-08-27. Last accessed 14th August, 2019. 
been orchestrated. This led to lot of argument 
and criticism, he was also suspended from the 
department. 
Focus group discussion with  
middle-aged male Hindu and Muslims in 
Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh
As this comment and previous comments in the 
Mumbai housewives group demonstrate, the online 
quickly bleeds into the offline world if a WhatsApp group 
member happens to dissent from the ruling ideology of 
the group. It is not as if one could allege a conspiracy 
where the BJP top leadership or even the leadership 
at state level are directly involved in censorship of 
individual comments in groups. The ideology of 
authoritarian hyper-nationalism in the context of a 
discourse of national security and being “anti-national” 
is enough to galvanise individuals into mobs who 
delete accounts, exclude recalcitrant members, dox 
and shame dissenting posters, destroy property, exert 
“pressure” to get a person suspended from their job, 
file a complaint with the police, or urge the police to 
act against victims for apparently disturbing the peace. 
It should be noted that in the state of Uttar Pradesh, 
Yogi Adityanath as Chief Minister has a personal track 
record of making hate speeches and threatening 
violence against Muslims64. In such a context, it is not 
necessary for an explicit message to be sent from top 
Figure 17: WhatsApp forwarded message combining 
nationalism and sexual violence. Widely circulated after 
Pulwama incident. The caption translates as “An oath on 
your mother, send this. Victory to Hindustan”.
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politicians directing particular incidents of violence. 
On the contrary, the above-mentioned instances of 
harassment become ways of lowly cadres being noticed 
and rewarded by the local political leadership and even 
the national leadership. Thus, there will be a number of 
people who are always on the lookout for those who 
can be attacked without repercussions and gain quick 
political mileage with little risk of punishment. 
Both in relation to kidney snatching and to the 
warmongering nationalist images following the Indian 
army airstrikes on Balakot, the messages that act as a 
trigger are produced and disseminated in a systematic 
manner; they fall into clear genres; and are targeted to 
produce affective states in recipients that make entire 
communities more prone to agree to, participate in, or 
view violence against particular targets as legitimate.
Figure 18: WhatsApp forwarded message comparing Indian pilot Abhinandan with a popular South Indian movie star.
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Conclusion: Questions of Policy and Regulation
At the beginning of the project, we found ourselves 
examining and categorising the various different 
types of image, moving image and audio footage that 
constitutes misinformation, disinformation and fake 
news in order to tease out and clarify their patterns. 
This led us to gather data to address the Research 
Questions “To what extent do the everyday users of 
WhatsApp think that they themselves, their fellow 
users, the different technological and social structures, 
and their intermediaries in government and corporate 
sectors, bear the blame for and therefore should 
take responsibility for increasing public violence and 
lynchings across India in the past five years? How do 
they conceive of solutions to these problems?” The 
foregoing sections have identified some of the answers 
to these questions: 
•  greater functional media literacy;
•  greater political education and critical media literacy; 
•  better means for reporting misinformation; 
•  better means for identifying and reporting hate-speech 
and other suspicious content; 
•  more speed, transparency and responsiveness when 
suspected misinformation is reported; 
•  More awareness of the use of WhatsApp by political 
parties and in particular by ruling political parties
•  More awareness given by the platform with regard 
to the role of the Indian police in preventing and 
prosecuting cyber-crimes against women and girls 
•  the labelling of messages as forwards; 
•  the enumeration of the number of times something 
has been forwarded. 
During the analysis of our data, we ourselves came to 
see an emerging typology amongst users who forward 
misinformation, which, while changing based on 
multiple factors, indicates a need for caution in accusing 
illiterate or rural users of being the primary spreaders 
and dupes of WhatsApp based misinformation. 
It is not as if one could allege a conspiracy where the 
BJP top leadership or even the leadership at state 
level are directly involved in censorship of individual 
comments in groups. The ideology of authoritarian 
hyper-nationalism in the context of a discourse of 
national security and being “anti-national” is enough 
to galvanise individuals into mobs.  
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Table 2: A typology of users
Likelihood 
of spreading 
WhatsApp 
misinformation/
disinformation 
and hate-
speech which 
contributes to 
and legitimises 
mob violence 
and/or lynching
WhatsApp 
presence 
Motivations and characteristics Major demographic 
features
VERY HIGH Initiators and 
administrators of 
multiple different 
types and levels 
of WhatsApp 
groups in which 
Hindu nationalist, 
party-political and 
ethno-religious 
misinformation 
circulates, including 
party-political 
student groups 
or frequent “first 
posters” and very 
heavy WhatsApp 
users who forward 
regularly and post 
stories.
•  Strong ideological commitment to ethno-
religious and nationalist ideology 
•  Often university educated
•  High or very high functional digital literacy 
– aware of all new ways of passing on 
information; high spec phones; multiple social 
media accounts; able to make and doctor 
moving image footage; understands the 
affordances of different platforms for political-
ideological work
•  Regular consumers of mainstream media 
•  Ideologically inflected media consumption
•  Politically savvy
•  Political party loyalties to the government/ruling 
party and associated politicians
•  Often involved in Hindutva politics offline
•  Often involved in multiple social media networks 
and groups with political and ethno-religious 
affiliations (Student, work-place, family, local 
neighbourhood, caste association, temple 
association, interest-based, friends, political)
•  Posts in English and Hindi wishing to appeal to 
national and transnational audience
•  High level of commenting on and/or policing 
of others’ posts – particularly those which 
question nationalist misinformation
•  Frequent trolling and doxing of opposing views
•  View themselves as (the only) true patriots
•  Often involved in anti-reservation discussions
•  Very critical of Congress and other regional 
opposition parties
•  Often posts fake infographics and statistics 
praising the current regime in India for economy, 
law and order, and other achievements
•  Sometimes run alt-news outlets or fact-checker 
sites that selectively call out news critical of 
policies of Modi and the BJP and that seem to 
“confirm” pro-BJP political misinformation.
Mainly: urban or small 
town, aged 22-50, Upper 
or Middle Caste, working 
or middle-middle class, 
Hindus (and Jains). 
Mostly male but include: 
some middle, upper-
middle- and upper class 
Hindu (and Jain) women 
aged 20-50. 
 
 
 
54
Likelihood 
of spreading 
WhatsApp 
misinformation/
disinformation 
and hate-
speech which 
contributes to 
and legitimises 
mob violence 
and/or lynching
WhatsApp 
presence 
Motivations and characteristics Major demographic 
features
HIGH Initiators and 
administrators 
of WhatsApp 
groups or very 
active members of 
WhatsApp in which 
local neighbourhood 
watch-style content 
circulates, also 
misogynist content 
/ stereotypes/ 
nationalist 
misinformation 
circulates.
•  Ideological commitment to nationalism
•  Ideological commitment to Hindutva
•  Literate and employed
•  Medium to high functional digital literacy
•  Cross-platform presence
•  Trolling of opposing ideological views
•  Posts in Hindi or vernacular to appeal to  
local audience
•  View themselves as protectors of the  
nation, patriots
•  Posts against Congress and opposition 
parties, and people allied to them as useless/
corrupt but also circulators of anti-national 
misinformation.
Mainly: small town and 
rural Hindu upper or 
middle caste, some 
OBCs, working and 
middle class, men. 
Includes a small 
numbers of middle 
class urban women.
HIGH Frequent posters in 
family WhatsApp 
groups and 
local WhatsApp 
groups in which 
neighbourhood 
watch-style 
content circulates 
about cross-caste 
relationships, petty 
theft, also primarily 
responsible for 
forwarding content 
about alleged “Child 
kidnappers and 
organ thieves”.
•  Medium to high functional digital literacy
•  Posts in Hindi or vernacular
•  Attends regular word-of-mouth gatherings 
where news is discussed
•  View themselves as protectors of family, faith, 
locality and values
•  View themselves as well-informed and 
community node
•  Passes on ethno-nationalist “facts” which 
have not been fact checked at times of high 
political tension.
Small town and rural, 
Hindu high, middle and 
lower castes, OBCs, 
Muslims, Christians, 
Sikhs, Others; mainly 
men aged 30 and above.
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Likelihood 
of spreading 
WhatsApp 
misinformation/
disinformation 
and hate-
speech which 
contributes to 
and legitimises 
mob violence 
and/or lynching
WhatsApp 
presence 
Motivations and characteristics Major demographic 
features
MEDIUM Semi-active 
members in several 
family, friends, 
student, local, 
workplace or interest-
based WhatsApp 
groups and local 
WhatsApp groups. 
•  Medium functional digital literacy
•  In the absence of data, downloads and passes 
on messages
•  Likes to feel part of a community online, 
worried about being excluded or viewed as part 
of an outgroup
•  Posts in English, Hindi and/or vernacular
•  Questions misinformation of certain types 
(particularly random misinformation) at times 
of peace
•  Sometimes fact checks (and so view 
themselves as possessing critical media literacy 
•  Often forwards messages that contain 
misinformation, without reading fully 
•  Can never read all the information coming in 
and so often bulk-deletes or bulk-forwards from 
certain groups 
•  May post or forward nationalist messages, 
random still and moving images of accidents/
deaths, sometimes with a question
•  May post or forward information put out by 
groups allied to opposition parties
•  May post accurate information put out by NGOs
•  May post misinformation put out by opposition 
groups or NGOs
•  May post or forward health misinformation
•  May question or stop forwarding health 
misinformation.
Mainly: urban, small 
town and rural, Hindu 
high, middle and lower 
castes, OBCs young 
and middle-aged men. 
But also sometimes: 
urban and small town 
Muslims, Christians, 
Sikhs, Adivasis; mainly 
men aged 18-65; but 
also includes: small 
number of Hindu 
women (35-50).
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Likelihood 
of spreading 
WhatsApp 
misinformation/
disinformation 
and hate-
speech which 
contributes to 
and legitimises 
mob violence 
and/or lynching
WhatsApp 
presence 
Motivations and characteristics Major demographic 
features
LOW Inactive or silent 
members in several 
family, friends, 
student, local, 
workplace or interest-
based WhatsApp 
groups and local 
WhatsApp groups.
•  May have low levels of functional digital literacy
•  May have medium levels of critical  
political literacy
•  Engaged with local communities in  
face-to-face civic activities
•  Very low-spec phones
•  Can afford very little data
•  Little personal time and privacy
•  Never posts information or misinformation
•  Never forwards misinformation.
Mainly: Urban working 
class, small town and 
rural, Dalit, Adivasi, OBC, 
Muslim, Christian, Sikh, 
Other: Mainly: girls and 
women; but also some 
older men.
LOW Members of 
WhatsApp groups 
that are critical or 
dissenting towards 
authoritarian 
nationalist policies 
and Hindutva 
politics.
•  High functional digital media literacy
•  High critical digital media literacy
•  High political literacy, multiple political 
affiliations, usually critical of BJP
•  Reads posts from multiple sources in national 
and international news
•  Calls out propaganda, fake news, hate-speech, 
misinformation and disinformation in multiple 
sources from mainstream and social media 
•  Aware of and uses languages of Human 
Rights as opposed to nationalism
•  Secular, non-religious
•  Regularly reports and questions 
misinformation and disinformation of all types 
and from all sources
•  Has initiated fact-checking or posts 
information from fact-checkers
•  Regularly attacked by online by trolls from  
the first two groups
•  Sometimes the victims of fake news  
and disinformation
•  Often under surveillance by state.
Mainly: urban, might 
belong to any religion or 
caste, men and women, 
older and younger; 
mainly middle class 
and upper middle-class 
but also some working 
class/students.
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Likelihood 
of spreading 
WhatsApp 
misinformation/
disinformation 
and hate-
speech which 
contributes to 
and legitimises 
mob violence 
and/or lynching
WhatsApp 
presence 
Motivations and characteristics Major demographic 
features
NONE Not on WhatsApp or 
any social media.
• Not on WhatsApp or any social media
• Not allied to any political camp
• Afraid of being labelled a trouble-maker
•  Critical of government and politicians’ actions 
which negatively affect their lives
•  Uninterested in being drawn into  
Hindutva agenda
•  Solidarity with local community shown 
through sharing of resources
•  May possess a non-smart phone or family 
doesn’t own a phone at all
• Negligible functional digital literacy
•  Often caring for others fulltime and/or 
working long hours
•  Might verbally pass on health-related 
misinformation or other misinformation 
received from someone with a smartphone 
but no chance of this leading to lynch-mobs of 
the type discussed in this report. 
Mainly: poor or very 
poor; generally, women, 
in rural areas and 
remote areas of all 
religions; also mainly 
Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim; 
occasionally – very poor 
rural or urban Hindus, 
men and women.
It can be seen – from the foregoing typology of users 
who spread disinformation and/or misinformation – 
that assuming most misinformation spreads through 
rural and/or illiterate users and targeting functional 
digital and information literacy interventions primarily at 
these groups would be both inaccurate and ineffective. 
While not all the listed characteristics and motivations-
to-forward or not-to-forward misinformation and 
disinformation apply to all users in that category, 
motivations often come tied together with particular 
positions within the current Indian social hierarchy. 
Our findings raise several troubling ethical and practical 
issues for WhatsApp (and other tech companies) 
and for any citizens or state functionaries interested 
in reducing the vigilante violence in India as well 
as the online hate-speech and misinformation that 
triggers it. These issues all centre around the tension 
between a genuine commitment to human rights 
and the commitments of the various parties to their 
different forms of power – to staying in government 
and promoting a particular form of intolerant ethno-
nationalism, to being the biggest messaging service and 
financial transaction hub in the country. 
While our analysis of the data undermines the view 
that the blame for all the horrifying violence that has 
come to be called “WhatsApp lynchings” rests solely 
with WhatsApp as a company or with poorly educated, 
digitally illiterate rural users, neither the company nor 
its users are absolved of blame. Both are implicated 
by the very accounts of the users we interviewed. So, 
given a situation in which Indian government and state 
functionaries have been shown themselves to engage 
in hate-speech, misinformation, to spread rumours 
and to countenance the murder of innocent citizens; 
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The messages that act as a trigger are produced and 
disseminated in a systematic manner; they fall into clear 
genres; and are targeted to produce affective states in 
recipients that make entire communities more prone to 
agree to, participate in, or view violence against particular 
targets as legitimate.  
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and in which some members of the police force and 
Indian justice system not only tolerate casteism65 and 
violent misogyny66 but have themselves participated in 
rape and molestation, all recommendations have to be 
understood as conditional on the context. 
To our knowledge, four petitions have been filed in the 
Madras, Bombay and Madhya Pradesh high courts 
across India demanding that users’ Aadhaar numbers 
and other official ID be linked to people’s social media 
accounts. Facebook has asked that all four be heard 
together by the Supreme Court. Along with these, a 
professor from IIT Madras, Dr V Kamakoti has made 
some recommendations about tagging the phone 
numbers of users who produce and share messages67. 
The Attorney General of the government has himself 
now argued for the linking of Aadhar to individuals’ 
social media, a move that our report suggests would 
be both anti-democratic and fruitless in preventing 
the most prevalent types of disinformation. In parallel, 
three states, Manipur, Rajasthan and West Bengal have 
passed state-level anti-lynching laws. These laws cover 
valuable ground in holding the state accountable in 
terms of identifying and punishing perpetrators as well 
as safeguarding and rehabilitating victims of lynching68. 
However, it is unclear to what extent these laws can 
curb the spread of disinformation on WhatsApp and 
other similar applications. 
The idea behind these demands and suggestions 
is supposedly for the Indian state to have the ability 
to track and trace the originators of a message that 
have violated Indian laws. Apart from the obvious 
deeply problematic implications around privacy of 
65 A Ramaiah, “Growing Crimes against Dalits in India despite Special Laws: Relevance of Ambedkar’s Demand for ‘Separate Settlement’”, Journal of 
Law and Conflict Resolution 3, no. 9 (2011): 151–168; A Ramaiah, “Growing Crimes against Dalits in India despite Special Laws,” LSE South Asia , last 
modified 2013, accessed June 9, 2017, blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2013/05/28/growing-crimes-against-dalits-in-india-despite-special-laws/; 
Rahul Singh, Criminal Justice in the Shadow of Caste: Study on Discrimination against Dalit and Adivasi Prisoners and Victims of Police Excesses 
(Delhi, 2019), accessed September 9, 2019, annihilatecaste.in/uploads/downloads/data_190118030229_21000.pdf
66 Naureen Shah and Meenakshi Ganguly, Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse, and Impunity in the Indian Police, 2009, accessed September 9, 2019, 
hrw.org/report/2009/08/04/broken-system/dysfunction-abuse-and-impunity-indian-police
67 Anand Venkatanarayanan, “Dr Kamakoti’s Solution for WhatsApp Traceability Is Erroneous, Not Feasible,” Medianama, last modified 2019, accessed 
August 29, 2019, medianama.com/2019/08/223-kamakoti-solution-for-traceability-whatsapp-encryption-madras-anand-venkatanarayanan/
68 Harsh Mander, “Showing the Way: On Manipur’s New Anti-Lynching Law,” The Hindu, last modified 2019, accessed September 19, 2019, thehindu.
com/opinion/lead/manipur-shows-the-way/article26007016.ece; Kishor Govinda, “West Bengal Passes Anti Lynching Bill, BJP Opposes It!,” Gauri 
Lankesh News, last modified 2019, accessed September 19, 2019, gaurilankeshnews.com/bengal-anti-lynching-bill/
69 On the recent shutdown of communications in Kashmir, the central government has increased its request for takedown of Twitter accounts, 
wherein some twitter accounts are accused of being sponsored or associated with terrorism without sufficient evidence. See Anuj Srivas, “Kashmir: 
Modi Govt’s Blocking Orders to Twitter Raise Questions Over Transparency,” The Wire, last modified 2019, accessed September 12, 2019, thewire.in/
tech/kashmir-twitter-modi-government-takedown-orders-transparency
70 See aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/pehlu-khan-lynching-indian-state-appeal-acquittal-accused-190815091140287.html 
crucial identifying data being available to foreign-
owned companies such as Facebook, there are 
equally worrying implications for data misuse and 
harassment by state forces, Indian corporates and third 
parties. Evidence suggests that such moves would set 
precedents for governments to demand user data for 
censorship of all types of dissent or worse69. 
The current existence and circulation of hate speech 
against minorities and of misogynist and pornographic 
content on openly available, non-encrypted platforms 
and apps (TikTok, ShareChat) has not been prosecuted 
systematically by the various legal means available 
across all Indian states to date. In fact, despite the 
existence of video and other evidence about unlawful 
killings, perpetrators have been walking free in recent 
months70. Calling for further surveillance of WhatsApp 
users on the pretext that this would put an end to life-
threatening rumours without using the current evidence 
from non-encrypted platforms and apps and without 
using laws to punish hate-speech, cyber-crimes and 
lynchings, and thus send a message to those planning 
further communal unrest and violence is mistaken and 
further endangers the human rights of Indian citizens. 
On public social media platforms, moderators are 
employed to take down content that is violent or abusive, 
that has been flagged as propagating hate, promoting 
terrorism and constitutes libel. Evidence suggests that 
while this goes some way to combatting the violent and 
hate-filled content that reaches most users’ screens 
and news feeds, there are two ways in which much 
hateful misinformation and violent misogynist and/or 
racist content continues to circulate: first, companies 
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and moderators themselves operate with political and 
religious biases; second the amount of such hate-speech 
that is generated far outstrips the ability of moderators to 
cope. Worse, on cross-platform apps such as WhatsApp, 
such content may flow freely without any technological 
possibility of moderating the content due to encryption. 
Therefore, measures are needed urgently to identify and 
block the phone numbers of WhatsApp users who are 
responsible for posting or forwarding even one instance 
of hate-speech on a non-encrypted platform or app (the 
majority of which is against Dalits, women and religious 
minorities), and to take down their posts, however far 
these have travelled. 
The key challenge here is to retain end-to-end encryption 
so users’ privacy in general, and those fighting 
for secular values and human rights in particular 
are protected, while at the same time, to hold the 
circulation of messages with hate speech, misogyny, 
abuse, incitement to violence and other forms of 
misinformation and disinformation accountable. 
Keeping this challenge in mind, we recommend 
that WhatsApp must act to curb the bulk sharing of 
messages, by restricting the sharing of messages 
to only one group at a time. Ideally, we recommend 
that this be the default setting for WhatsApp users in 
India, and if not as default, then it should be strongly 
considered during occasions where it is known that 
violence tends to transpire – such as in the run up to 
elections or when rumours of child-kidnapping are 
circulating in a given town/city. 
In order to prevent users’ being added to groups without 
their permission, especially by members of political 
parties and (quasi) religious groups, we recommend 
that the default setting should be that an individual user 
cannot be added to a group without his/her permission. 
Instances of disinformation that lead to vigilante 
violence are extremely time-sensitive. Rumours of 
cattle-killing, possession of beef, child-kidnapping 
etc. can lead to mobs murdering already vulnerable 
individuals in a matter of minutes. Given this situation, 
we recommend that WhatsApp introduce a “beacon” 
feature where a warning/advisory can be broadcast 
from WhatsApp to users in specific locations about 
specific issues. 
71 For example, after the horrific rape of a young woman in Delhi in 2012 (known as the Nirbhaya case), the Indian government has introduced a 
special helpline (dial 112) for reporting sexual violence. Taking this helpline as a template, it could be made easier for WhatsApp users to connect 
directly to this or to similar helplines from within the application. 
Finally, we also recommend that WhatsApp introduce 
a mechanism whereby users, especially women and 
sexual minorities are able to report hate speech, 
misogyny, sexual violence etc. on a separate fast-
tracked route in partnership with local or state-level law 
enforcement71.
In response to intense criticism by the Government of 
India and in the Indian media as well as threats to limit 
its scope in India, WhatsApp has made several changes 
to its technical features in order to curb the spread of 
disinformation and misinformation (see WhatsApp 
usage in India on page 20). While the long-term 
effectiveness of these remains to be seen, given that 
they have primarily been implemented since the middle 
of 2019, our findings so far indicate that these are 
simply not enough to stem the tide of misinformation: 
murders are still occurring based on rumours spread on 
WhatsApp. Further, we have learnt that to circumvent 
the restrictions on how many forwards at a time, and 
how many members are allowed in groups, many 
users are downloading and using outdated and/or 
unauthorised versions of the app (such as WhatsApp 
GB and WhatsApp Plus) which are available on Android 
operating systems which enable them to bypass some 
of the recent changes in the application. 
Action is obviously urgently needed to stamp out 
the spread of illegal clone apps and to discourage 
the use of outdated versions which breach users’ 
updated terms of service. However, to begin to tackle 
the non-stop dissemination of hate-speech, violent 
misogyny and religious bigotry on both outdated and 
legitimate versions of the App, and to deal with and 
prevent the violent consequences which have claimed 
and devastated so many lives in India, we strongly 
recommend that WhatsApp employs a politically 
literate, well-informed, human-rights aware, trained 
team to work with a range of non-governmental human 
rights, women’s rights, journalism and technology rights 
organisations on the ground in India to lay out a range 
of aims and solutions. 
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